

RE:THINK

ACADEMY-MAGAZINE#01

ACADEMY
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
NRW

AI and
International
Politics

MESSAGE FROM THE MINISTER PRESIDENT



Exchange and openness to the world are the quintessence and economic livelihood of North Rhine-Westphalia. As a hub of industry and commerce in the heart of Europe, we are dependent on the economic exchange with our European neighbours and partners. What is more, innovation and solutions can only arise if we are open to people and ideas from all over the world.

However, we are currently facing an enormous challenge: We must resolutely confront the threat to peace and security that has arisen in Europe. The fundamental principles of international law and the territorial integrity of all states are not negotiable. That is why we stand with Ukraine, against which Russia has been waging a war of aggression in violation of international law for a year and a half now. The people of Ukraine are fighting for their lives and for their freedom, for their right to self-determination and sovereignty. They are also fighting for our freedom, for security in Europe and for the principles of international law and democracy.

The expression "Zeitenwende" aptly describes the new situation in Europe. The vast majority of people on our continent have grown up in peace. We have taken peace in Europe for granted. It is, however, not a given. It is therefore all the more important that we engage more heavily than before in debates on security policy. We need to strengthen our military defences. Whoever attempts to disarm democracies, renders international law useless and strips sovereign nations of freedom. That is why North Rhine-Westphalia supports the delivery of weapons to Ukraine. For the same reason, we are placing the armed forces where they belong: in the centre of society. They deserve our appreciation and respect, the right equipment and all the necessary skills to protect our territory and that of our NATO-allies.

The Academy of International Affairs NRW embodies our openness to the world, our international outlook and North Rhine-Westphalia's view of current geopolitical developments. As the only German UN location, Bonn, with its renowned university, numerous institutes and the federal ministries, stands for networking and exchange.

The federal city of Bonn is the right place to look for solutions to global challenges. The academy fits into this outstanding location and pays particular attention to the transfer between researchers and practitioners in many fields. I would like to thank the Academy of International Affairs NRW for its many initiatives and ideas. Keep going on this path of success and I wish you all the best!

Hendrik Wüst MdL

The Minister President of the State
of North Rhine-Westphalia

EDITORIAL



The AIA Magazine's inaugural issue delves into AI's role in international politics, offering insights on its benefits and risks while exploring broader international developments. This global perspective, cultivated in North Rhine-Westphalia, reflects the promise of AIA as the new home for international affairs.

If any further proof had been needed that we live in a time of global change and new challenges, it was provided by the dramatic recent deterioration of the situation in the Middle East. Like Russia's full-scale war on Ukraine, we can understand this escalation of violence as the result of a global geopolitical shift. The upheavals are taking place at a rapid pace and hereby challenging those with political responsibility enormously. This is where policy advice and scientific expertise are urgently needed. And precisely because the region of the Middle East in particular has repeatedly been subject to a further escalation and expansion of conflicts due to the different actors and their geopolitical interests behind it, we are dedicating a section of our first issue to this region.

North Rhine-Westphalia is a hub for Artificial Intelligence (AI) and modern technology and the home of the Academy of International Affairs (AIA). Its exceptional universities and research institutions have positioned North Rhine-Westphalia at the forefront of technological progress. It holds immense potential for politics, governance, and economic development.

Since its foundation, AIA has always focused on groundbreaking, future-oriented topics such as "Artificial Intelligence and International Politics", "The Geopolitics of Disinformation", and most recently "Outer Space Affairs". You will be able to find some of the insights generated in the events and research under our roof in Bonn in this very first issue of the AIA Magazine, which seeks to contribute to developing and strengthening the profile of North Rhine-Westphalia in its European and international engagement.

The thematic focus of this issue is AI, which has no doubt become an integral part of our daily lives and an important geopolitical factor impacting on politics across borders. Its potential benefits are substantial, but so are its risks. In this issue we discuss, among other topics, questions of legal

regulation and governance of AI, cyber diplomacy and other relevant aspects of AI, and international politics.

Along with contributions focussing on AI, this issue also brings together insights on other important developments in the international sphere. You can, for instance, read about the lessons learned from the withdrawal from Afghanistan and the complex developments in Eastern Europe.

Questions related to these topics can only be answered from a global perspective. A perspective that we foster in North Rhine-Westphalia with the brightest minds from around the world. AIA is the new home for international affairs. That is our promise.

I wish you a thought-provoking read that provides you with orienting knowledge and new insights in these difficult times of world politics.

At this point I would like to thank my excellent team, without whom the work presented here over the last 3 years would certainly not have been possible.


Dr. Maysoun Zein Al Din
Executive Director of the Academy
of International Affairs NRW



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
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AI AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Artificial Intelligence (AI) plays an increasing role in international relations. Fellows of the Academy have focused on this urgent global topic from different disciplinary and cultural perspectives.



“We Need All Social Actors”



Alexandra Geese
Participant,
Summer Academy
2021

INTERVIEW **Alexandra Geese** on risks and regulation of artificial intelligence

You are involved in the regulation of social media and artificial intelligence. Is the current technological revolution more of a curse or a blessing?

It's not quite so clear cut. It's up to us as a society and, of course; particularly up to lawmakers to decide. I advocate for the impacts of AI to be actively addressed to solve issues like discrimination and resource consumption.

What is the specific impact of AI?

AI affects various aspects of our daily lives, be it the job market, housing, insurance or loan allocation. However, AI doesn't view people as individuals but rather as members of groups. That goes against our democratic and liberal values. Taking HR as an example, in the future women might be unjustly rated lower than men due to shorter continuous working hours.

We've also seen challenges in cases like that of the entrepreneur who was automatically granted an Apple Pay overdraft limit 20 times higher than what his wife was allocated even though they shared their businesses, income and

all possessions. AI assumes that women are generally less creditworthy due to historical restrictions on their earnings and property ownership.

Could AI also lead to fairer decisions?

The issue is that AI creates future projections based on vast amounts of past data. Research methods like de-biasing can be used to avoid discrimination. However, AI is predominantly developed by 80 to 90 percent male professionals and primarily by five major American corporations. They are interested in promoting their products, but not in reducing discrimination or environmental impact. That's why it's up to society to demand otherwise.

What does AI mean for democratic societies?

One key issue is disinformation. Texts and images can be generated and disseminated at incredible speeds using AI. And then there are deep fakes, like manipulated videos of individuals saying things they never actually did, but which appear remarkably real. What is more, algorithms prioritise

“In much of Europe and the USA, we agree that we’re on the right path to achieving international standards.”

Alexandra Geese

accounts that rapidly publish content, such as YouTube and Russia Today, the state-run disinformation broadcaster. Social media AI learns that people engage more when exposed to content, often false, that triggers outrage, fear, and anger. The more interaction, the more ads they can be shown. AI-driven disinformation is especially dangerous because no credible news source can compete with that volume of disinformation.

Another point is that if certain population groups are systematically disadvantaged by AI, existing trends will intensify unless action is taken.

What is most crucial for legal regulation of AI?

AI applications vary widely. The first category includes programs that are incompatible with a democratic society. The European Parliament intends to ban real-time public space surveillance. For example, Hong Kong and London have cameras everywhere that continuously observe people and combine data in real-time. Another ban targets social scoring where individuals are rated and subject to restrictions based on their score, as practiced in China. Systems for detecting sexual orientation also have to be prohibited. The second category covers high-risk applications used in healthcare or border management with a clear certification process. Certification shouldn’t only focus on the technical functionality of AI but also on preventing discrimination. The third category comprises so-called foundation models, like large generative models such as ChatGPT. We want to make it obligatory for manufacturers of such models to carry out risk assessments. For example, if ChatGPT could be misused for bomb-making, they have to suggest ways of mitigating that risk. The manufacturer is also obliged to disclose the data sources used to train the models. That is crucial in combatting discrimination and understanding how a given AI tool works. And then of course there are copyright concerns when other people’s works are used as data sources without permission.

What role does Europe play compared to the USA and China in the field of AI?

With the European AI Act we have the opportunity to set a standard that establishes global benchmarks. However, we have to ensure that we don’t only regulate but also develop technology in Europe. AI requires significant infrastructure, vast amounts of data, capital, and skilled individuals. We have the latter in Europe, but many AI experts migrate to the USA. China makes substantial state investments, and the USA sees a lot of private investments. We lack

the capital, infrastructure, and data on those scales. It is crucial that we enforce the General Data Protection Regulation against Google & Co. and don’t allow them to continue collecting data that forms the basis of their advertising revenues and profits. Google and Facebook’s control of online advertising leads to significant losses for publishers. We need to think about how we can generate the capital required for AI investments in Europe, especially through competition policies that prevent monopolies. Currently, substantial funds flow through online advertising that we need in Europe to finance high-quality journalism and invest in digital technologies.

Is there a chance for an international agreement on AI regulation?


It depends on whether the USA and Europe can join forces. China has a completely different concept of AI, with AI serving as an instrument for monitoring and oppressing the population. Given the different value bases, I see little hope for a comprehensive global agreement on all critical AI topics. Nevertheless, the European Commission is not only proceeding with legislation through the AI Act but also negotiating an AI Pact with the American government. In much of Europe and the USA, we agree that we’re on the right path to achieving international standards.

What opportunities does politics have in general? Can it still shape or only react?

We are actively shaping things; we have been working on the AI Act for two years. Democratic legislation, however, requires some time to achieve reasonable, fact-based consensus. Throughout history, there have always been phases of radical change within societies, with each new technology triggering something else.

However, never before have we experienced such concentration of power in individual private companies, as is the case with AI. Nor has any technology impacted all aspects of human life as deeply as AI. That’s why politics has to act swiftly, as do society, unions, churches and NGOs. That’s why independent research in this area is so crucial. We mustn’t resign ourselves to passively enduring AI, but rather actively shape it. We can only find the right answers if all social stakeholders pull together. ■

Alexandra Geese has been a Member of the European Parliament since 2019 and is the digital expert for the Greens/EFA parliamentary group. She was elected Vice-President of the Group in 2022.

The image shows a screenshot of the OpenAI website's introduction to ChatGPT. The page has a dark green background. At the top left is the OpenAI logo. To its right are navigation links for 'Research', 'Product', 'Safety', and 'Company', each with a downward arrow. The main heading is 'Introducing ChatGPT' in a large, white, sans-serif font. Below the heading is a paragraph of text in white, explaining that ChatGPT is a conversational model. At the bottom of the text area are two buttons: 'Try ChatGPT' with an external link icon, and 'Read about ChatGPT Plus' with an underlined link. On the right side of the page, there are several horizontal bars of varying lengths and colors, including purple and blue, which appear to be part of a decorative or data visualization element.

OpenAI

Research ∨ Product ∨ Safety Company ∨

Introducing ChatGPT

We've trained a model called ChatGPT which interacts in a conversational way. The dialogue format makes it possible for ChatGPT to answer followup questions, admit its mistakes, challenge incorrect premises, and reject inappropriate requests.

[Try ChatGPT ↗](#) [Read about ChatGPT Plus](#)

ChatGPT and Disinformation

New technologies invariably spark controversy. More than 2,000 years ago, Socrates thundered against the invention of writing, being fearful of the forgetfulness it would cause. While writing has redeemed itself over the past millennia, the recent introduction of generative language models such as ChatGPT or GPT4 have drastically transformed our relationship with generative artificial intelligence (GenAI), and hence ourselves.

With its software being able to pass the uniform bar exam as successfully as most aspiring human lawyers, the capabilities of GPT4 are astounding indeed. In light of this performance, and numerous other examples of seeming intelligence¹, it is hard to dismiss GPT4 as just a “bullshit generator.”

It is too early to tell whether GPT or other GenAI tools will also redeem themselves in the future – but at present, the concern about their impact is widespread. For example, Geoff Hinton, widely known as the “godfather of AI”, issued a stark warning that GenAI might get out of control and “take over” from humans². Universities, journals, and funding agencies have scrambled to develop guidelines for the use of GenAI tools to prevent plagiarism and the delegation of tasks to GenAI, for example, in evaluating grant proposals. Unquestionably, we are living in revolutionary times. The extraordinary impact of those new technologies is undeniable, not only within their own realm but particularly in terms of the political, scientific, and societal fallout.

Especially in the context of international relations, there are two issues of particular concern. The first relates to bias and transparency, and the second to misinformation. In order to understand the potential for bias, we must examine the underlying material on which GPT and other GenAI tools are trained. As Gaurav Sharma explains in his contribution, GenAI is trained on massive corpora of existing human text harvested from the internet and encompassing trillions of tokens. This gives rise to crucial questions, such as: who selects those corpora? How can we know if they can provide

an accurate representation of human knowledge? And if not, then how can we trust GenAI to give us useful and accurate answers?

The Washington Post recently examined the corpora used to train some high-profile GenAI tools³, with concerning results. Among the sources used to train GenAI were known white-supremacist sites as well as a message board infamous for organizing targeted harassment campaigns against individuals, websites promoting conspiracy theories, amongst them the far-right QAnon ideology, and further sources of online hate and misinformation, including a website that is a notorious purveyor of climate denial misinformation. When ChatGPT was queried about its potential reliance on questionable sources, it responded as follows: “While I attempt to prioritize sources that are widely recognized as authoritative or reliable, it’s possible that I may generate responses based on unreliable or inaccurate information that has been widely circulated on the internet.... I am not a replacement for critical thinking or careful evaluation of information. It’s important for users to be aware of the potential for misinformation and to critically evaluate the information they receive from any source, including from me.”⁴

In other words, GenAI comes with sufficient self-awareness to pass the buck back to humans.

How should humans respond?

Is it realistic to assume that people will always perform the careful examination required to detect and correct

“The availability of GenAI places large-scale furtive manipulation within reach of bad-faith political operators or foreign adversaries.”

Stephan Lewandowsky

errors, let alone subtle biases, in GenAI’s responses? It seems highly likely that a person will resort to GenAI precisely to avoid the effort involved in constructing accurate and bias-free text. Therefore, the risk of users simply accepting output verbatim from GenAI seems high. Moreover, the responses from GenAI will themselves depend on the query formulated by the user. Humans and algorithms are deeply intertwined, and human biases might be reinforced by their algorithmic counterpart.⁵

But even if humans lived up to GenAI’s expectations – which are rarely clearly articulated and difficult to meet – the second problem concerning misinformation remains unsolved.

Truth, as they say, is the first casualty of war. But often, truth is the casualty that causes war: from the role of radio station RTLM in inciting the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 to the Gulf of Tonkin incident that triggered U.S. involvement in Vietnam, to the mythical Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq that were used to justify the U.S. and U.K. invasion in 2003 – misinformation has been a precursor to violent conflict in many historical instances.

GenAI is known to “hallucinate” – that is, it provides answers with considerable confidence that have no basis in reality.⁶ The problem is accentuated when human operators exploit GenAI to generate messages with the aim of misleading or misinforming the public. Although GenAI refuses to assist in criminal activity and explicit breaches of privacy, disinformation researchers have raised the alarm that GenAI “is going to be the most powerful tool for spreading misinformation that has ever been on the internet”⁷, and some have argued that through health



FELLOW

STEPHAN LEWANDOWSKY is a cognitive scientist and professor at the University of Bristol and the recipient of numerous awards and honours, including a Discovery Outstanding Researcher Award from the Australian Research Council, and a Humboldt Research Award from the Humboldt Foundation in Germany. He is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Science (UK) and a Fellow of the Association of Psychological Science. He was elected to the Leopoldina in 2022. His research currently focuses on the persistence of misinformation and spread of “fake news” in society.

disinformation, a foreign adversary could use GenAI to increase vulnerability in an entire population during a future pandemic.⁸

Although it may appear far-fetched to assume that an entire population could be “gaslighted” by GenAI, research in my laboratory has underscored those risks: in an as-yet unpublished series of studies, Dr Almog Simchon asked GenAI to customize political ads to be particularly persuasive to people of different personalities – and sure enough, the versions of the ads that matched people’s personality were deemed to be more persuasive than those that mismatched. Given that advertisers can target ads on Facebook to people of certain personalities, the availability of GenAI places large-scale furtive manipulation within reach of bad-faith political operators or foreign adversaries.

Are there any solutions to those problems?

One possible solution involves using GenAI to detect misinformation automatically. A recent analysis of more than 20,000 fact-checked statements has shown that ChatGPT is able to classify them with nearly 70% accuracy.⁹

This is far from perfect; however, given how easily this could be automated and scaled up, it may be a good start. Another related solution involves the training of other machines (call that DetectAI) to detect AI-generated content—irrespective of its factual status—to pinpoint attempts at manipulation. Unfortunately, this may not be a feasible long-term solution as other AI tools could be trained to avoid detection by the detection software (Invisible-GenAI is trained to avoid detection by DetectAI). Therefore,



a more promising machine-learning approach; proposed by Professor Fil Menczer of Indiana University, is to “move the detection from the individual to the group level. As bad actors employ AI to create the appearance of many people promoting an agenda, there is an opportunity to develop coordination detection algorithms to spot suspiciously similar content and behaviours.”

A different approach involves regulation. In extreme cases, regulation can mean banning GenAI altogether – as shown by Italy temporarily in early 2023, citing privacy concerns. Other options might involve regulating aspects of the behaviour of GenAI, for example by demanding that it be unbiased and fair in its output. Although attractive at first glance, this option may fail due to the difficulty and occasional impossibility of establishing a universal understanding of what it implies to be unbiased or fair¹⁰. A further challenge to the regulation approach is a political one: at least in the United States, the mere idea of any kind of regulation of AI seems out of reach in light of U.S. District Judge Terry A. Doughty’s recent order to prevent the U.S. government from communicating with social media platforms to safeguard elections against misinformation or to combat misinformation in a public-health crisis. Although this injunction has since been lifted, at least temporarily, there is little doubt that any effort to regulate content that is currently under the control of the tech companies will face fierce partisan resistance by Republicans.

If neither technology nor regulation offers a clear path forward, what is left?

Perhaps the solution will emerge over time by humans adjusting their behavior and cognition to the new GenAI-shaped environment. While we may have lost our ability to recite the Iliad by heart, as Socrates feared, it has not prevented us from acknowledging the valuable lessons of that ancient story up to this day, such as what happens to a community when we train people to put themselves and their interests ahead of everything else. ■

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Cyber Diplomacy at the German Foreign Office: From pandas and bears to norms and treaties

Dr. Regine Grienberger, Keynote,
Reception of the Consular Corps
of NRW



As a Cyber Ambassador at the German Foreign Office, I contribute to enabling people to live and work in a digitally connected way while safeguarding their data. The internet, upon which our digitized society, economy, and politics rely in the 21st century, has become a contested space. Geopolitical conflicts are being fought here, and numerous cyber criminal organizations operate within it. The security of the internet is not a given, and we must take action to ensure that it remains free and open.

One of the primary tasks of cyber diplomacy is to observe and analyze the threat landscape: which incidents jeopardize the stability of the cyberspace, and who is responsible for them? What are the intentions of malicious actors, such as hacker groups named “Cyber Panda” and “Berserk Bear” by IT security firms? And how can we stop them?

Cybersecurity – but how?

Defending against cyber-attacks and securing your systems is primarily an individual responsibility. Good cyber hygiene and precautions help to repel many attacks. As the majority of networks are privately owned, and software and hardware come from private manufacturers, the private sector bears significant responsibility. Therefore, “Security by Design” is becoming the new standard in Europe. However, the state also plays a key role. It can regulate and actively support, especially through the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)

and the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA). This is underpinned by relevant laws and a cybersecurity strategy for Germany.

The central pillar of German cyber diplomacy is the “Multi-Stakeholder Approach.” It involves shared responsibilities between the state and individuals, companies, academia, civil society, as well as authorities and security agencies.

However, cybersecurity in Germany cannot be ensured solely within the German borders. We need to cooperate with international partners because we are interconnected with them. We must also engage with adversaries who try to spy on us or exploit our interconnectedness using cyber means. The most important instrument for cyber diplomacy is the European toolbox. It forms the basis for joint action among European member states, the European Commission, and the European External Action Service. The toolbox includes preventive and cooperative measures, such as building technical capacities, as well as diplomatic warnings (“démarches”) and cyber sanctions.

As modern weapon systems are interconnected, cyberspace has also become a military domain. Therefore, cybersecurity plays an increasing role within the NATO military alliance. The ongoing Russian war against Ukraine demonstrates in real-time how cyber weapons are employed, but also how a country can defend itself with cyber competence. The resilience of the Ukrainian society shows that digitization not only increases the attack surface in cyberspace but can also strengthen and stabilize a country. Cyber conflicts can quickly escalate beyond the digital realm, sometimes unintentionally. Confidence-building measures help to mitigate this risk, as we have learned from the Cold War. Just as we need a “red telephone” and more transparency in traditional diplomacy, we require the same in cyberspace.

Norms and rules in cyberspace

Beyond preventing, avoiding, and resolving conflicts in cyberspace, developing norms is a crucial task for cyber diplomacy. How do states behave responsibly in cyberspace? Alongside various multilateral formats, the United Nations plays a central role in shaping these norms.

The spectrum of rules can vary widely: they can be consensual and non-binding, legally binding under international law, or even take the form of a treaty. From a German perspective, it is essential that these norms follow the principles of the United Nations Charter and respect human rights. International law applies equally to cyberspace and the physical world, and human rights apply both online and offline.

International norm-building processes are under pressure. Applications based on Artificial Intelligence are spreading rapidly and creating facts. While AI programs promise new economic opportunities and faster progress in tackling global issues such as health and climate change, they also undoubtedly pose significant risks. These include the automation of weapons systems without human control, biased and discriminatory algorithms, “data colonialism,” and the exploitation of a new digital precariat.

Perspectives of cyber diplomacy

What can a world order with new technologies look like? In order to develop proposals, we must carefully examine the foreign and security policy dimensions of AI developments. Therefore, cyber diplomacy will be supplemented by AI diplomacy or, more broadly, technology diplomacy.

After all, cyber diplomacy goes beyond just establishing a set of rules. The German Foreign Office actively contributes, together with its partners, to implementing norms and rules. This involves fostering international partnerships with countries such as Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, the Western Balkans, and West African states.

Given this backdrop, the Foreign Office has also taken on a new – and so far underfunded – task of building cyber capacity. This includes establishing networks; providing training, harmonizing legal frameworks, and enabling joint law enforcement. The aim is to distribute good technology

through “best practices” while curbing the spread of poor or risky technology, e.g., through export controls.

The great potential of cyber capacity building lies in strengthening international cooperation in a key area of the “Digital Age”: cybersecurity. ■

Dr. Regine Grienberger has been the Cyber Ambassador at the German Foreign Office since 2020.

“The security of the internet is not a given, and we must take action to ensure that it remains free and open.”

Regine Grienberger

AI will Drastically Transform the Strategy and Armament of Nations

IN CONVERSATION Moritz Weiß and Sven van Hove

MORITZ WEIß: With the emergence of new technologies and companies in the fields of AI and cybersecurity, we witness a significant transformation of how nations arm themselves. Many pressing questions arise concerning the use and impact of AI.

SVEN VAN HOVE: Much is still uncertain, as only a few AI-powered weapon systems are in use, and the cutting-edge research in this area is not easily accessible. However, it is safe to assume that militarily ambitious states like the USA, Russia, China, and partially Israel are investing massively. The term “AI Arms Race” is used in scientific literature to describe an incredibly fierce competition for technological leadership. In 2021, there was a deployment of AI-controlled lethal drones by the Israeli army in the Gaza Strip, which was documented as the first such case. Once completely autonomous weapon systems are developed, they become relatively easy to reproduce. This means that such systems can be built in large quantities, they are financially viable, and their military and strategic benefits are immense. Due to low casualties, they also positively impact troop morale. For instance, we have seen this in the use of drones in Azerbaijan, Libya, and now in Ukraine. On the one hand, the relatively low costs of AI make states

more capable of waging wars while maintaining public support. On the other hand, we see significant reservations; particularly in Germany. Funds for armed drones were only approved after over a decade of debate in the Bundestag. There are concerns that using armed drones might turn war into a video game-like experience, making it easier to kill. And this is just considering remotely controlled weapon systems; we have not even touched on the use of AI yet. In the long run, most states will face pressure and be compelled to invest in AI systems. We know that the Chinese and Americans have been working on large drone swarms dropped by carrier systems for years, which then autonomously search for and engage targets. When looking at the individual technologies required for this, many are already highly developed; they just need to be integrated. Because of the advantages offered by AI and the competitive nature of armed forces, Germany will have to follow this development – sooner or later.

MW: Ultimately, AI is an “enabling technology” rather than a weapon system. This is key to a better understanding of its opportunities and threats. Perhaps one can think of it in analogy to an engine. Motorization has revolutionized all forms of warfare and power projection. How exactly AI



will do this is still unclear. AI is already heavily utilized in simulations to facilitate decision-making. In facial recognition, it is already massively deployed, with potential military applications as well. Although this can be achieved without AI, large datasets are essential. For instance, the Americans partially applied this with their so-called “signature strikes” in Pakistan. They identified typical characteristics of terrorists rather than verifying individuals. The challenging transition lies in the process from automation and “machine learning” towards the step of autonomous decision-making. It is still not entirely clear where the boundary lies. This raises significant concerns in normative, moral, and political realms, for instance, that decisions will no longer be made by humans but by AI. This applies to autonomous drones and all forms of autonomy in armament. AI is thus a technology that will drastically change the strategy and armament of nations.

SVH: Currently, remote control of these weapons is only feasible to a limited extent because jamming can disrupt it. The Russians have been relatively successful in Ukraine at making drones uncontrollable. However, AI will allow them to continue flying autonomously and searching for, identifying, and engaging targets. Targeting is the crucial final step that

is not easily relinquished, as it implies a loss of control. We do not always fully understand how AI arrives at its results; it remains a black box. Hence, there are legitimate concerns.

MW: Concerning the division of labor between private and public actors in the development of AI, we observe an interesting diversification. Traditional arms companies either try to incorporate and advance the technologies or integrate them into their systems. Alternatively, they seek to acquire small companies that are highly advanced in this field. At the same time, digitalization is not just about high-tech weapons but also about organizational development. Consequently, consulting firms, traditional software developers, and users are increasingly involved. The field becomes much more blurred, involving more companies primarily serving civilian markets rather than exclusively working for governments. This alters the interaction, as very different business models converge. For the state, it becomes more complex to align with these actors.

SVH: Private companies have massive data centers to train AI. The business models that emerge initially do not pursue at military purposes. For example, facial recognition is used to unlock phones, and it is a huge market. Providers or



developers will think twice about working for armed forces of a particular country without losing revenue or potentially alienating other countries and markets. For instance, working for the US army may have negative consequences for business with China. Traditionally, states or military entities have not been technological leader. Even highly relevant military developments, like the Manhattan Project and the development of the nuclear bomb were driven by researchers from the civilian sector. The armed forces face the same challenge now. We see that a big technological leap will occur in the coming years. Armed forces are simply not capable of driving this development themselves; they depend on the private sector. Therefore, there are many strategies to stay in the game through collaborations.

MW: This asymmetry of expertise suggests that the private side will certainly gain influence. One must not forget something inherent to AI: the need to train these systems with vast amounts of big data. In Germany, this is more challenging due to relatively regulated data protection, but it is not impossible.

What we always have to keep in mind is that an applied AI sold to a government is entirely different in scale and cannot be easily compared to our use of, for instance, ChatGPT. However, this also implies that a defense contractor, such as Rheinmetall, requires a distinct form of a sales organization, which has established close exchanges with customers

(i.e. governments). Take, by contrast, Google, which decided to no longer collaborate with the Pentagon, yet won't go bankrupt from this decision. True, Microsoft and Palantir compete for big contracts, but for them, it is only part of their business. The much more critical part is civilian markets. In a nutshell, arms and technology acquisitions will change.

SVH: However, a high demand from states could also motivate companies like Rheinmetall to acquire smaller firms to keep up with innovations. Their market extends well beyond Germany. This would have significant benefits for our government, as it would allow better management of innovations and weapon systems. But smaller and highly globalized companies are challenging to control; particularly concerning software development. These are products that can be sent around the world with a mouse click and the developers are highly mobile.

MW: The key question is what exactly is being regulated. Most of these products are what we call "dual-use applications," meaning they are suitable for both civilian and military purposes. Many AI programs and software solutions currently fall into the dual-use category and are thus not heavily regulated. The US government can clearly exclude cooperation with other states through contracts. Smaller states may not have that convenience. In short, the export

regulation of AI applications is much more complex than traditional arms. AI products are significantly easier to transport, making it challenging to determine their current place of development and production.

SVH: Additionally, with software, it is difficult to exclusively attribute it to one particular actor. You have to carefully examine the program, as many of its parts are widely used across various platforms. By contrast, with tanks, copying the blueprints alone was not enough; they also needed the production techniques, like high-quality steel manufacturing. Once developed, software can easily be copied and spread across the world.

MW: In the end, it may be similar to conventional weapons. The arms trade was hardly regulated before World War I. Both Krupp and Vickers faced significant trouble because they had sold to and produced in the enemy's home. Later, the English and Germans shot at each other. As a result, regulations on arms trade were tightened. For now, there is relatively little political commitment to regulation, but it will undoubtedly come; particularly at the EU level.

SVH: It needs to start with the political will to seriously address AI-powered weapon systems. Sooner or later, we will be compelled to do so.

MW: Vanguard states and companies are not very interested in regulation. It is entirely utopian to think that the Western world would stop research in this area and leave it entirely to the Chinese. Therefore, the development and diffusion of AI-enabled systems will be further triggered by today's global competition between great powers.

SVH: Unlike Western states, China can keep the development of this advanced military technology strictly confidential. It is challenging to assess the technological status here. In the USA, however, whistleblowers or individuals who use online platforms and release classified documents are occasionally found.

But I am sure that we will see great leaps in technology in the next few years that have the potential to change the balance of military power. If a state manages to be far ahead, it will have a favourable position to negotiate and make agreements to regulate AI-powered weapon systems. ■



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Technical Standards for AI-Systems in the European Union: A critical challenge for civil society

Background on AI regulation in Europe

The European Union is preparing for the forthcoming adoption of a horizontal regulatory framework applicable to AI systems in the European market. The AI Act proposal is currently being negotiated within the EU legislative bodies¹. This legal instrument is based on a classification of AI systems according to their risks to health, safety and fundamental rights (i.e., unacceptable, high or low) and adjusts the legal provisions to be applied by suppliers of such systems accordingly. Certain AI systems will be prohibited; particularly in the field of biometric identification and social scoring. High-risk AI systems, such as those used in critical infrastructures, education or justice, will be subject to essential requirements (e.g., risk management, data governance, transparency, human oversight) that should be translated into “harmonised standards”. In that respect, the AI Act gives a key role to “standardisation”². This means the adoption of non-binding technical recommendations or requirements with which products, manufacturing processes, or services can comply and which are developed by consensus within standardisation bodies. Think, for example, in the digital ecosystem, of the standards for wifi, as a family of wireless network protocols based on international standards.

Harmonised standards under the EU AI Act

The AI Act builds on Regulation (EU) No 1025/2012 on standardisation to define, in Article 40, the legal contours that will be given to harmonised standards. This provision states that high-risk AI systems that comply with harmonised standards adopted for the purpose of translating the aforementioned “essential requirements” of the AI Act and whose reference has been published in the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU), will be presumed to comply with binding EU regulations. This presumption of conformity therefore confers a “quasi-regulatory” dimension on standards, which demonstrates the importance of their development. This has also led to criticism of their (lack of) constitutional legitimacy³. Standards are not adopted through an open democratic process and are not freely accessible for organisations or citizens. They are subject to intellectual property rights and, in

principle, have to be paid for. Future AI European standards will have to specify and explain the exact coverage of these requirements (e.g., in terms of risk management, data quality, automatic event recording, transparency, human control, robustness, etc.), so that the scope of the presumption of conformity is clearly established. Harmonised standards do not therefore replace “hard law” (i.e., here, the provisions of the AI Act), but provide operators with a technical means of complying with it. They should make it possible to reduce the risks of the AI system concerned, without relieving the provider of its responsibility.

EU AI standard-setting process in practice

Work on developing these European standards applicable to high-risk AI systems is underway within the European standards bodies – the European Committee for Standardisation (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation (CENELEC) – and the Joint Technical Committee (JTC) 21 on AI standardisation. Based on the EC standardisation request in support of Union policy on AI, released on 22 May 2023, the JTC 21 is expected to deliver the AI standards deliverables by 30 April 2025 at the latest. To do so, it shall submit a “work programme” indicating the standards, the responsible technical bodies and a timetable for carrying out the requested standardisation activities. It is also necessary for JTC 21 to be able to justify the efforts made to ensure, on the one hand, the multi-stakeholder participation of the stakeholders in the AI ecosystem, especially SMEs and civil society organisations in the EU, and, on the other hand; particular expertise in the field of fundamental rights and data protection. In practice, several expert sub-groups with CEN-CENLEC JTC 21 are already working on the operational aspects of AI systems (in particular risk and compliance), engineering (e.g., natural language processing, governance and data quality) and societal aspects of AI (e.g., trusted AI characteristics, AI-enhanced nudges, green AI). For the time being, these working groups are largely composed of representatives of major non-EU tech companies (e.g., from the US and China). It is therefore important for European operators, including SMEs, and civil society, including academic researchers, to have their say.

A plea for EU civil society involvement in AI standardisation

In this context, it is important for AI practitioners and researchers in all sub-disciplines to be informed and

involved in this process; this important dynamic is called inclusiveness⁴. Indeed, those future AI standards will shape the new regulatory landscape of AI ecosystems and, more generally, of the digital society in Europe and beyond. Civil society representatives, including scholars in the field of AI, should be more and more aware of the key challenges of AI standard-setting and become involved in the monitoring, dialogue and co-construction of future European AI standards. This requires the European authorities to support this multi-stakeholder participation; particularly financially.

This would be particularly relevant in order to build an AI regulation rooted in the EU values, including the respect of human rights, based on Article 2 of the EU Treaty⁵. While AI technical standards are also being developed at international level, within ISO in particular⁶, not all of them can be transposed per se to the European context. The AI Act provides for European specificities in AI regulation, starting with the protection of fundamental rights based on the “essential requirements” (mentioned above). Future European standards are planned by the EU to ensure AI systems’ compliance with human rights enshrined in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the values of human dignity, freedom, democracy and the rule of law. This is a real technical; political and legal challenge⁷. To this end, the European standardisation ecosystem for AI systems must be made known to the entire AI community including civil society and scholars. ■



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The Two Meanings of AI Governance



The unparalleled technological advancements in Artificial Intelligence (AI), robotics, computer sciences, and associated domains have already instigated and will persist in driving significant transformations across all facets of human activity. Including societal areas like law, medicine, military, finance, and banking, among others, the beneficial impacts of AI are revolutionizing the daily lives of millions. However, the deployment of AI also carries considerable adverse implications; particularly for minority groups. For instance, in the United States, African-Americans face challenges in areas such as parole decisions in the legal system, racial profiling, as well as job and loan applications due to AI applications. The circumstances are equally difficult for women. Hence, it is critically essential to address the adverse effects of AI; particularly issues like machine bias and non-discrimination, fairness; privacy, and security (Gordon and Nyholm 2021)⁽¹⁾.

AI governance emerges as a viable solution to address these challenges by establishing binding policies at a regulatory level. But what does AI governance entail? The term is often narrowly understood by many as simply the regulation of AI. However, AI governance has two primary connotations: the first interpretation pertains to the regulation or governance of AI, while the second refers to the application of AI

in governance. Both these aspects are encapsulated under the broader umbrella term of "AI governance."

According to B.J. Copeland, AI is "the ability of a digital computer or computer-controlled robot to perform tasks commonly associated with intelligent beings. The term is frequently applied to the project of developing systems endowed with the intellectual processes characteristic of humans, such as the ability to reason, discover meaning, generalize, or learn from past experience"⁽²⁾. The term governance generally refers to the steering and regulatory system of a political and societal unit such as a state or municipality. By combining these elements, we arrive at the general concept of AI governance.

Governance of AI

Without appropriate AI governance; potential risks and challenges; particularly machine bias – one of the most significant issues in AI – would not only persist but also exacerbate existing biases towards minority groups in areas like law, medicine, and the banking and finance system, among others. In essence, the most vulnerable populations would become even more susceptible. Therefore, it's crucial to regulate AI and implement key principles such as transparency, accountability, fairness, and security.

These principles should guide tech companies, developers; programmers, and users in the design, development, and utilization of AI.

Collaboration among various stakeholders, including government; private sector, and public, is essential to mitigate or eliminate the effects of machine bias. At the very least, five aspects should be implemented:

1. a functional algorithm (the software must be in order)
2. data must be prepared
3. diversity in the team (programming, design, etc.)
4. adequate testing phase to rule out problems
5. monitoring in operation with multiple levels with control functions and countermeasures (problems must therefore be identified and resolved).

Only when the issue of machine bias is adequately addressed can we begin to feel more at ease about the associated risks and challenges. This, however, does not imply that other problems are insignificant or that they should not be resolved (they certainly should). Instead, it suggests that a significant burden will be lifted once the problem of machine bias has been sufficiently tackled.

AI in Governance

A topic that often goes unnoticed, yet holds significant importance, is the proposition of employing AI in the realm of political governance. Potential applications could include automated tax filing, online voting systems for public elections, and responding to citizen inquiries. Further possible implementations could encompass aiding politicians in decision-making by providing them with necessary information on specific issues; proposing solutions to political decisions in governance, and generally streamlining procedures through automation. The domains of application are virtually limitless, as are the challenges; particularly those related to security.

A more futuristic vision proposes that political governance will eventually be entirely managed by AI, freeing humans to focus on pursuits they truly enjoy and desire (with respect to the future of work see Danaher 2019)⁽³⁾. According to this proposition, machines, being impervious to bias or influence by money or power, would make the best political leaders. Whether this vision is accurate, and whether the issue of machine bias can be fully resolved, is yet to be determined. However, what is certain is the expanding role of AI support systems in governance in the coming decades.

AI governance and machine rights

To add another layer of complexity, depending on the technological advancement of AI machines and robots – which assumes the presence of artificial general intelligence, or AGI – it is conceivable that they might attain a moral and legal status in the future thereby becoming entitled to moral and legal rights (Gordon and Gunkel 2022⁽⁴⁾, Gordon 2022⁽⁵⁾, Gunkel 2018⁽⁶⁾).

This topic is currently the subject of active and lively debate. It appears that the future of AI Governance must also adequately consider these issues to prevent the creation of an artificial race of sapient and sentient beings

relegated to servitude (Gordon 2023)⁽⁷⁾.

In conclusion, AI governance should strike a balance between overly strict regulation, which could hinder technological advancements, and overly lax regulation, which could lead to additional harm for vulnerable groups. As is often the case, the optimal solution seems to lie in finding a middle ground. ■

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Generative AI and the Conundrum of Transparency



FELLOW

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Generative AI (Gen AI) discussions have taken central stage in the technology worldwide with the poster boy ChatGPT a special Gen AI application infused from a large language model (LLM), GPT-3 generates human-like text and conversations. Gen AI is arousing significant interest and impacting thinking around AI as a technology that has the power to solve huge global challenges such as climate change. Simply put, Gen AI is advanced AI that is trained on massive datasets comprising more than a trillion tokens. It requires many orders of magnitude of computing power and is significantly more sophisticated and complex than any of its predecessors, with vast output components able to perform multiple tasks.

The impact of Gen AI is currently being seen in the policy world through the lens of ChatGPT. There is much excitement and at the same time, apprehension, as the rate of development and new Gen AI-infused applications are rapidly becoming an everyday phenomenon and there is open adoption by the end-user. Furthermore, with little or no regulation, the private sector is thrilled to ride the wave of Gen AI-infused applications. The absence of regulatory guard rails or checkpoints to assess the harms and risks posed by Gen AI is creating friction and a sense of doubt. This article points out the worries around Gen AI regarding 'transparency', as it is envisioned that Gen AI will have an impact across sectors and change the way AI engages within the industrial process framework and with citizens' lives and society at large.

Transparency regarding Gen AI is concerned with 'information transparency'. This is challenging as the enormity and complexity of Gen AI means creators unable to understand how models work and developers are unable to debug their own models. Gen AI developers and designers are unable to understand the behaviour and performance of these models on different tasks. End-users do not understand their options

for alternatives and policymakers and regulators have no idea how to regulate Gen AI, as they do not understand what these AI systems are in the first place. The challenge around Gen AI transparency needs to be understood in three dimensions.

1. Transparency regarding Gen AI creators and providers:

Currently Gen AI is being developed and deployed by only half a dozen organizations (OpenAI & Microsoft; Google Research, DeepMind, MetaAI, NVidia, and Runway). This is because huge high-performance computing power and a highly skilled workforce in computer science are needed to be able to successfully deploy Gen AI models and develop Gen AI based-applications. The pace of development and deployment thus depends on financial investment in research and development, computing infrastructure, and key skillsets. This monopolization impacts on transparency in the absence of regulation or any sort of checks and balances to control Gen AI development.

2. Gen AI model formulation transparency: There are currently no mechanisms or techniques in place that can provide a complete picture of the Gen AI model or even offer a reasoning as to how the model's output was generated. The mechanisms behind the Gen AI architecture have yet to be fully understood, even by experts. Furthermore, Gen AI datasets are frequently sourced from diverse internet platforms, often lacking specific formats. Gen AI capabilities are not static, and continue to grow, and every Gen AI model and Gen AI-infused application serves a different set of problems and has an individual set of stakeholders and users. This implicates that the transparency requirements for Gen AI would be (are?) different from model to model. Lastly, Gen AI-infused applications could be built on many interacting Gen AI models, for example ChatGPT text output could be integrated into Stable Diffusion (a Gen AI application that generates text to images) and these could be made to operate external services such as ordering food and booking tickets without any human intervention. In essence, there is 'capability unpredictability' in each Gen AI model which can only be tested based on typical inputs and behaviour of output.

3. Transparency regarding public perception of Gen AI:

Gen AI public perception is currently being shaped by mass-media coverage, online marketing campaigns; public events and discussions, and usage of Gen AI-infused applications such as ChatGPT by the public. As Gen AI is relatively new; public perception is still evolving, and is difficult to identify due to the complex mechanisms of Gen AI and the lack of accurate, comprehensive and reliable information. Furthermore, organisations that are creating Gen AI-infused applications do not reveal everything and only communicate bits and pieces. Thus; people and especially decision-makers may have flawed mental models of what the Gen AI systems are and how they work. Inaccurate public perception creates transparency issues that are harder to comprehend and resolve.

With reference to the above challenges, Gen AI currently remains an enigmatic AI system. Transparency in terms of information, functional and mechanistic understanding as to how it works, as well as explanations regarding its processes are still at the nascent stage. There is also a race to invest in bigger, more advanced, and more complex Gen AI systems as size does matter in Gen AI. Thus, only a few rich large technology companies are taking the lead and accelerating the Gen AI race. They dominate the market share while ignoring concerns regarding transparency.

The challenge of transparency is rather complex in Gen AI and to even get this addressed in the first instance, Gen AI creators must be made accountable to certain audit and regulatory authorities. They should be regulated with minimum guard rails that address the monitoring, evaluation and auditing of the design, development, and implementation of Gen AI. Gen AI creators should employ robust internal governance processes that promote 'Responsible AI' development. Furthermore, incentivisation for enhanced transparency requirements must be promoted to have a reliable Gen AI development.

At its core, Gen AI transparency should prioritize a more human-centered approach. This necessitates further research into the intricate workings of the complex Gen AI architecture. Moreover, it demands the advocacy of ethical self-regulation, and a moral stance towards Gen AI development, starting from the big-tech companies and extending to the wider AI community, encompassing developers, designers, and users in general. The policy community should embrace Gen AI transparency as a broader concept rather than solely fixating on individual Gen AI models in isolation. ■

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23.08.-26.08.21

SUMMER ACADEMY -
Research and Diplomacy in Dialogue

Artificial Intelligence and International Politics

The Academy of International Affairs NRW held its first Summer Academy at its inauguration. From 23 to 26 August 2021, 39 participants from 23 nations met at the Petersberg near Bonn. At this first event of the Academy, the role of artificial intelligence in international relations was highlighted. The selected young researchers and diplomats met renowned experts. **Prof. Dr. Kristian Kersting** from the TU Darmstadt, the Bonn Humboldt

Prof. Dr. Aimee van Wynsberghe and **Prof. Dr. Christopher Coker** from the London School of Economics and Political Science were among the speakers. They discussed the civil and military development of artificial intelligence and the global race between states that has already begun.

The “AI and International Politics” Summer Academy lectures



MAXIMILIAN MAYER:

AI and the Complexity of Global Technology Politics

“We need to look beyond that geopolitical level to understand the transformation and the different impacts AI will have and already has. AI is not simply a tool that can be used and applied by nation states. It is too complex for that and has too many unintended consequences. AI can perhaps even be a weakening factor, contributing to the illusion that there is more control.”

KRISTIAN KERSTING:

The Third Wave of Artificial Intelligence

“What is really the most important question in AI? It is probably the AI alignment problem. So, imagine that we get that super intelligence. Even if you have the super machine the question is how to tell the machine what to do. And this is a super difficult question. It’s a question of asking what to do, what to think, what are our values. And it is not all about regulation.”



ROGIER CREEMERS:

China’s Data Strategy and its International Impact

“China presents us with a world that we never thought possible. It was simply unimaginable to us that a country could be non-liberal democratic, not a market capitalist state and yet successful. We have consistently underestimated, and we continue to underestimate the enormous amounts of dedication, competence and the ability that Chinese government has.”

AIMEE VAN WYNSBERGHE:

The Third Wave of AI Ethics and a Need to Focus on Sustainable AI

“I suggest that sustainable AI is a movement to foster change in the entire lifecycle of AI products towards greater ecological integrity and social justice. I worry that AI ethics is not paying enough attention to sustainability, and that we need regulation in order to protect the environment, vulnerable demographics and ourselves from the consequences of this technology.”





“From the start, the Summer Academy focused on an urgent global topic from different disciplinary and cultural perspectives.”

Dr. Mayssoun Zein Al Din, Executive Director of the Academy of International Affairs NRW

**ULRIKE FRANKE:
AI Geopolitics**

“What tends to be overlooked in Europe is the fact that AI is influencing international relations. And most importantly it is influencing the international balance of power meaning that some states or indeed some other non-state actors are gaining in power through AI and through technologies while others are loosing power relatively in relation to.”



**CHRISTOPHER COKER:
Artificial Intelligence, Autonomous Systems, and the Future of War**

“Religious, ethical, ideological conviction, moral right – these are all things that win wars and we are in danger of forgetting that. The real artificial intelligence may end up being our own. We may end up being less intelligent than we are today simply because we take so little account of the human factors that motivate people to fight.”



PETRA MOLNAR:
Bots at the Gate – Migration Management and Technological Experiments

“I think at the bare minimum there has to be recognition that these automated decision-making systems have to respect international human rights and domestic legislation and that the context is key. We are talking about a high risk laboratory for experiments when it comes to immigration and refugee law. So we need transparency first and foremost about what the State is doing. Independent oversight would be really helpful as well and also finding new binding standards on these really high risk cases.”

IMPRESSIONS AND LECTURES AS VIDEO

**SUMMER ACADEMY 2021:
 “AI and International Politics”**





29.08.–01.09.22

SUMMER ACADEMY -
Research and Diplomacy in Dialogue

The Geopolitics of Disinformation – Social Media and International Relations

Already in its second year, the Summer Academy has become a keystone event in the Academy of International Affairs NRW calendar. The format has proven to be a successful platform for exchange between academics and diplomats, with numerous applications in 2022. A total of 34 participants from 19 nations were selected to exchange ideas with experts on the topic of **“The Geopolitics of Disinformation – Social Media and International Relations”** from 29 August to 1 September 2022. The targeted creation and dissemination of fake news has, after all, long since become a problem and proven

instrument of international politics. **MEP Alexandra Geese**; **Prof. Dr. Sergei Guriev**, Minister of the Interior of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia **Herbert Reul**, and other experts gave presentations and answered questions from the auditorium afterwards. At an evening reception, the participants also had the opportunity to talk with the Minister for Federal and European Affairs, International Affairs and Media of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia and Head of the State Chancellery **Nathanael Liminski**.

The Summer Academy lectures: “The Geopolitics of Disinformation”



ALEXANDRA GEESE:
**The DSA Deal: A Gamechanger for our Lives,
Society and the Internet**

“The DSA Deal is a landmark legislation. Europe is the first continent to come up with a piece of legislation that comprehensively regulates digital platforms more or less globally. It will apply to platforms whose services can be used in Europe. Since we all know that these platforms are basically all American or Chinese it means it might become a global regulation because Europe is still the biggest market.”

SARAH KREPS:
The Politics of Technology-Enabled Misinformation

“I’m not convinced that American lawmakers yet know enough about this technology to be thinking they should do anything about it. But I share the concern that we have a public space that is being regulated by private entities. At the same time, we are a democracy. It’s a very fine line between hate speech and free speech, and community standards and censorship, and whose values go into that.”



ANITA GOHDES:
Social Media and Social Unrest

“How do leaders actually respond in times of unrest? The question is an important one because reactions to domestic unrest don’t only effect domestic politics, they also affect international relations and foreign policy. And we know – we’ve been following that for a very long time – that states will engage in that as a reaction to domestic politics.”



HAO LI:
**Unpacking Deepfakes – Creation and Dissemination of
Deepfakes**

“You can be whoever you want. You can make that person do anything you want. It is pretty much indistinguishable from reality. If you put additional effort you can make it artefact free where it’s really hard for a human to actually tell a difference. Not only is the code very simple, it’s very easy for people to use it even if they don’t understand the underlying technology.”





Minister of the Interior of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, **Herbert Reul**, honoured us with a discussion about Cybersecurity.



SERGEI GURIEV:
Spin Dictators

"We classified dictatorships into spin dictators and fear dictators. We argue that spin dictators are now the majority. These guys use manipulation of information to concentrate power. Instead of terrifying people they actually deceive people. Disinformation is the keytool of modern non-democratic regimes."

AYUSHMAN KAUL:
Social Media and Security

"Political actors use social media platforms because of their ability to function as our modern town square. They have supplanted the traditional means through which we as individuals interact with obtained information and also decide what we feel about that information through debate and discussion of others also using these platforms."





ALIAKSANDR HERASIMENKA:
**Multinational State-Backed Computational Propaganda
 and the Russian Invasion in Ukraine**

“The organizations behind disinformation campaigns manipulate public opinion. They try to weaponize health, climate and political controversies so as to undermine national institutions. So, it is one of the key focuses of these types of campaigns. Not to advertise a specific ideology for instance that could be used during the cold war period. They try to undermine national institutions.”

**IMPRESSIONS AND
 LECTURES AS VIDEO**

**SUMMER ACADEMY 2022:
 “The Geopolitics of Disinformation”**



100 HOURS IN KABUL

Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs) from crisis areas have been poorly researched. Jamie Ferrill, Tim Lannan, and Christian Leuprecht seek to fill this gap and draw lessons.





The Afghanistan Drawdown: A microcosm of challenges



During their residency at the AIA NRW, **Jamie Ferrill**, **Tim Lannan**, and **Christian Leuprecht** explored the NEO from Afghanistan in August 2021, conducting three dozen interviews with key individuals and stakeholders, visiting NATO headquarters; participating in parliamentary review panels, and compiling a wealth of primary reporting from political, civilian, and military sources.

A NEO is the militarization of a civilian evacuation due to a rapid deterioration in local security conditions. It requires assets, capabilities and agility under conditions of insecurity that only the armed forces can provide. NEOs need advance planning to prepare for their eventuality. Who is legally or morally entitled to be evacuated? How to get people to an extraction point? What logistics and airlift capacities are required to extract people? These questions hang like a cloud over the August 2021 evacuation from Kabul.

Key findings of the project come down to the importance and character of civil-military relations, which, in the words of Peter Feaver, is commonly understood to mean 'the control and direction of the military by the highest civilian authorities in nation-states'. In particular, they shed light on failures by political authorities, civilian actors, and militaries alike in the way they relate and (mis)construe their respective roles and responsibilities. The conventional Huntingtonian compromise prescribes that militaries and politicians keep out of one another's business. Or, as in the case of Janowitz, or Schiff, about how to manage the civil-military gap, commonly understood to mean the divergence between

the civilian population and the military in terms of values, understanding; participation, and culture.

However, these theories were conceived for a world where the military's primary role was national and collective defence. The Afghanistan drawdown shows that they are not particularly useful for the purposes of deterrence, conflict management and crisis prevention, and capacity building. In contrast to national and collective defence, which is existential, these other tasks are discretionary. Ergo, the mission sets – that is, the ways, means and ends of a mission – are an instrument of foreign policy and thus ultimately political. In these circumstances the military is an agent under the direction of the principal, which is the political authority: the national political authority or, in the case of NATO, the multinational political authority. In other words, the principal has to task the agent. In theory, the agent then carries out the task. In practice, the agent is prone either to shirking its responsibilities, or to letting them slip.

That often happens in cases where the executive oversteps its authority. In the case of the Afghanistan drawdown, however, the distal and proximate problems were the exact




opposite: in the months leading up to the drawdown, militaries were left on their own in the absence of clear political direction and ignorance of political realities on the ground, which culminated in the eventual crisis.

NEOs are inherently complex, all the more so if they are international as in Afghanistan. Military and civilian bureaucracies from different countries need centralized command and control along with the capacity to coordinate amongst themselves. Since NATO has few military assets of its own, it is heavily reliant on support from member states for operations. NEOs are a case in point. With the advent of the crisis, little political direction was forthcoming, which left the US and a handful of allied militaries to do what they could with the resources and direction they had, while most allies managed political risk and opted to stay out of the fray altogether. These findings have important implications: in applying the appropriate model of civil-military relations, both to avert and to manage crises, especially ones such as the drawdown crisis in Afghanistan that had been amply predictable.

In that regard, the Afghanistan drawdown is a microcosm of challenges in civil-military relations that prevailed throughout the 20 year mission.

Climate change and food and energy insecurity are compounding rapid changes in the contemporary security environment. As a result, armed forces are likely to be called upon again, at short or no notice, to support; plan, conduct or lead a NEO internationally, or a comparable mission domestically. Yet, there is little scholarship on NEOs, and, insofar as there has been any retrospective at all, allied and partner countries such as the US, UK and Germany have largely foregone specific lessons learned from the Afghanistan NEO in favour of broader ex post facto reviews of the entire Afghanistan mission. This project aims to fill those gaps. ■



FELLOW

JAMIE FERRILL is a lecturer at the Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security, Charles Sturt University. Holding a PhD in Organizational Behaviour (Loughborough University, UK), a Masters in Homeland Security (University of Connecticut), and a Bachelors in Criminal Justice (Mount Royal University), her research focuses on human actors, ideology, and domestic and transnational cooperation in security threats.



FELLOW

CHRISTIAN LEUPRECHT is distinguished professor at the Royal Military College of Canada, editor-in-chief of the Canadian Military Journal, director of the Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, and adjunct research professor at Charles Sturt University. He researched and taught at Yale University, NATO Defence College and Johns Hopkins University. Member of the College of New Scholars of the Royal Society of Canada and recipient of the Cowan Prize.

23 August 2021, 12.30 p.m. – 27 August 2021, 4.30 p.m.

EYE-WITNESS ACCOUNT Landing at the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul on 23 August 2021 was a surreal experience. It was only 7 days after the Taliban had taken control of the capital and the Afghan government leadership had discretely slipped out of the country.



FELLOW

TIM LANNAN worked at NATO Headquarters for 16 years, including 4 years as the Head of the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre. He served the Canadian Armed Forces for over 20 years. He is a graduate of the Royal Military College of Canada and the United States Naval Postgraduate School. He received the NATO Meritorious Service Medal for his deployment to Kabul in 2021.

As the ramp dropped on the C-17 cargo plane, I watched in shock as thousands of disconsolate Afghans were being escorted to waiting aircraft to evacuate them from their homeland. They were luckily escaping with their lives but with very little dignity. They risked everything for a new life of hope in another world, with nothing more than a plastic shopping bag full of what they could salvage in their race to leave the country.

The ultimate price

More than one million military personnel served in Afghanistan for over two decades, and many paid the ultimate price for their service. For me, it was the first time returning to Afghanistan since August 2006 after completing a year-long tour in the Islamic Republic in an advisory role. At that time, there was euphoric optimism that the quality of life for Afghans could improve as a result of the international community's engagement. Fifteen years later, the atmosphere was far from optimistic; it was a scene of chaotic desperation. For many of the soldiers who served in Afghanistan, the military defeat only compounds the physical and emotional injuries they suffer.

The international community's 20-year well-intentioned intercession ended in calamity and shameless abandonment. Afghans at risk of abuse by the Taliban due to their affiliation with the NATO intervention were desperate to escape a dire situation. In a very short timeframe, more than 125,000 Afghans were filtered through various access control points set up around the airport and boarded

what were termed “freedom flights”. One such freedom flight had a record 823 passengers on board, but there were thousands left behind and only a negligible effort to evacuate more Afghans who are at risk.

Desperate hope

The busiest and most dangerous access control point to the airport was at the infamous Abbey Gate, which was located adjacent to the British controlled Baron Hotel and a 200-meter sewage canal. For ten straight days, around the clock, Afghans could either wait at a Taliban access control point or wade through the sewage canal in knee-deep waste to have their eligibility and credentials verified, for a chance to be evacuated. At Abbey Gate, I represented NATO and I would discern eligible Afghans from a prioritized “list” of those who could be processed and transferred out of Afghanistan on behalf of NATO. Several other NATO allies and partner states, also working at Abbey Gate, had multiple staffing resources to assist in the evacuation including special forces, embassy staff and immigration officials who would process the Afghans for the respective governments who were willing to resettle selected at risk Afghans and their families.

As I was on my own at Abbey Gate, I was dependent on the cooperative support from the militaries of Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Tragically, on 26 August, 2021, less than ninety minutes after NATO evacuated its last family from the sewage canal at Abbey Gate, thirteen United States service members, who were supporting myself in NATO’s evacuation effort, lost their lives in a suicide attack, as well as more than 150 Afghans. On 27 August, 2021, 100 hours after I landed in Kabul, NATO’s last flight from Kabul departed at 4.30 p.m. local time with six NATO civilians and a plane full of Afghans. Aside from the scars of defeat, I wonder, what will NATO take away from its Afghanistan experience? ■



The AIA Afghanistan Research Project Team consisted of two scholars and a civil-military professional who was directly involved in the Afghanistan NEO at the NATO political decision-making level in Brussels as well as the operational level of the evacuation in Kabul. *Jamie Ferrill*, *Tim Lannan* and *Christian Leuprecht* analyze lessons from the Afghanistan NEO and the first-hand practical experience from other case studies to examine a shifting paradigm in civil-military relations. This unique collaboration of practitioner and scholars is an exemplary model that bridges theory and reality. Christian and Jamie delve into the lived experience of Tim in the lead up to the evacuation, and his 100 hours in Kabul evacuating more than 2,000 NATO Affiliated Afghans and their families. Through Tim’s personal account and the scholarly objectivity of Christian and Jamie, the team hopes to ensure this chaotic situation never happens again.

Lessons from the Afghanistan Withdrawal



IN CONVERSATION Rangin Dadfar Spanta

Excerpt from the broadcast "Eine Welt" on Deutschlandfunk radio



Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta, Participant, "Rehabilitating Civil Military Relations Post Afghanistan"

More than 286,000 people from Afghanistan are currently registered in Germany as asylum seekers. The prospects of a swift return to their homeland are slim. The Taliban have solidified their power and are shaping the country according to their vision, bearing little resemblance to a modern Afghanistan. Rangin Dadfar Spanta, former Afghan Foreign Minister and later Security Advisor, considers the concept of "state-building" to have failed.

What were your thoughts when you reached the military part of Kabul Airport to leave Afghanistan?

It was a feeling of melancholy and pain. I thought about the loss of lives and the sacrifices we had made over the last 20 years for a better, peaceful Afghanistan, which had tragically failed.

Did you realize at that moment the magnitude of the catastrophe that would follow?

It was clear that a catastrophe would occur, but the extent was difficult to assess. I could not have imagined the complete destruction of education in Afghanistan, the exodus of hundreds of thousands of people, and the banishment of women from education, training, and public life on such a scale.

In hindsight, what mistakes by the international community led to this disaster?

I know that this debate is currently overshadowed by the Ukraine conflict. I no longer hold much faith in state-building projects. I believe that nations should build their societies from within, with foreign support if needed. The idea of exporting democracy to other countries has failed. Imposing a state order on other nations is not feasible. Afghanistan is one proof of this, Iraq is another example. In these countries, as in Syria and Libya, everything has deteriorated. Local populations should be the drivers of development and reforms. Without their participation, foreign intervention can achieve very little.

What criteria would you apply to future foreign deployments, such as those in which the Bundeswehr may participate?

Such deployments should be considered as the last resort and carried out only in exceptional cases. Making it a routine to send soldiers to Africa, Asia, and other countries is not something I support.

How far should the German government go in cooperating with the Taliban?

This is a delicate issue. Nevertheless, we must differentiate between humanitarian engagement and actions (within the framework of development cooperation), emergency, and disaster relief. We know that nearly 28 million people in Afghanistan are dependent on foreign humanitarian aid. That is one aspect. In this regard, we must remain committed and alleviate their suffering as expected. However, this cannot be a long-term solution. On the other hand, we should not grant legitimacy to an illegal group that operates without a constitution and the principles of the rule of law. ■

Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta is a political scientist who last served as National Security Advisor of President Hamid Karzai. Prior to that (2006 to 2010) he was Foreign Minister of Afghanistan.

The Last Plane out of Kabul



Ambassador Stefano Pontecorvo, Keynote, "Rehabilitating Civil Military Relations Post Afghanistan"

On Friday, 27 August 2021, at 6:21 p.m., NATO's Afghanistan mission formally ended. At that moment, aboard an Italian C130, as the last representative of the Atlantic Alliance, I crossed the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

For the first time in twenty years, Afghanistan was without a NATO presence. We left the country, leaving it in the hands of the same Taliban we had driven from their position of power within weeks twenty years earlier. We left a country that had believed in us and a population condemned once again, certainly not by choice, to a future very different from the one we had given it a glimpse of. The evacuation of Kabul Airport in August was a unique incident, both from a political and military point of view, against the backdrop of the Tal-

iban's rapid takeover of Afghanistan. In my role as part of the NATO civilian presence responsible for maintaining the airport's operations, I witnessed the events that unfolded during a chaotic evacuation.

The disintegration of the Afghan Republic

The evacuation took place after the NATO "Resolute Support Mission" had ended. General Scott Miller was the last NATO military member to leave Afghanistan. After that, the airport was no longer under direct control of

NATO. The various national forces, including American, British, Turkish and Afghani soldiers, were deployed under national command.

I stayed on the ground as a civilian representative of NATO. Our goal was to keep the airport operating. NATO had been operating the airport since 2003 to initiate a new phase of allied engagement in Afghanistan and to support the Islamic Republic and its armed forces.

When the last NATO military forces left Afghanistan, the Taliban saw their chance to assert their supremacy had

come. The Afghan military suffered the loss of confidence and disillusionment that gripped both public opinion and the army when the withdrawal of the US and its allies from the country became concrete. This was compounded by the progressive abandonment of the political leadership that culminated in President Ghani's flight on 15 August. His departure was followed by the collapse of institutions and gave decisive impetus to the evacuation at Kabul airport. With his flight, the fate of the Islamic Republic was sealed, and any prospect of NATO's continued involvement in Afghanistan faded.

Escalation of the evacuation effort

The evacuation process in which I was involved initially focused on evacuating Afghan citizens, including local embassy staff; politicians, civil servants, journalists; prominent women, and civil society activists. The plan called for evacuating these individuals, who were at risk under Taliban rule, over a period of two to three months. However, the situation on the ground deteriorated rapidly. By mid-July, most of those who had cooperated with allied forces had left the country. The evacuation was intended to be exercised within two or three months, the presumed time box for completing the list of the departure was until October or November 2021. But with the dramatic turn of events the evacuation had to be operated into weeks, with a deadline of late August.

Preparations for the departure of thousands of Afghans and their families revealed that eight out of ten had no papers. NATO personnel who had been in the field for 20 years did not have passports. This caused delays and complications during the evacuation process. The Taliban progressively took control over more and more territories.

Operational aspects of the evacuation

The fact that NATO was not a state proved to be a disadvantage, as the NATO military mission officially ended in early July and subsequently relied entirely on the support of Allied members.

The primary responsibility for evac-



uating citizens and allies rested with US and British contingents. However, the increasingly unstable situation prompted other nations to send smaller contingents to support evacuation efforts.

They operated independently, so coordination was critical. Initially, there was no coordinated effort at all, and this created tension between the various national contingents at the airport. Even though I had no formal role in this matter, I stepped in to avoid the conditions from becoming untenable and took things in hand. I began to coordinate meetings between the masters and commanders of all national forces twice a day. Not an easy exercise. There were numerous issues: most of them concerning gate transits and plane schedules in particular.

125,000 people evacuated

Nevertheless, in a matter of days we finally sorted it out, based on a proposal that we put forward, and that the Americans, who were carrying the military and logistical weight of the whole operation, agreed to. Despite all the challenges and delays, a significant number of Afghan nationals were evacuated through the coordinated efforts of the national contingents. NATO's

list included 1,600 Afghan nationals; in the end, 2,100 NATO-affiliated Afghans were rescued. Communication on the airfield was chaotic, with more than 20 nations each pursuing their own interests; the number of flights was limited to 120 slots.

Despite all these hurdles, we managed to evacuate 125,000 people. We did it just through coordination on the ground, not through a predetermined system for situations like these. That's why I advocate working a lot more on thinking through all the various phases of similar operations. ■



Ambassador *Stefano Pontecorvo*, a long-time diplomat, is the former Italian Ambassador to Pakistan where he served until February 2020.

Outreach in Berlin



“As for the lessons learned, there is the question of the mission itself. The anti-terror fight quickly turned into administration building and military training. Regime change was not achieved.”

Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, former German Minister of Defence (2019–2021)


“We have to become less dependent on our allies.”

Dr. Ralf Stegner, Chairman of the Committee of Inquiry Afghanistan (since 2022)



“Germany did not assess and formulate its own goals adequately, what was the mission about, the German Armed Forces also had to pursue civilian goals which is not their task.”

Michael Müller, Chairman of the Enquete Commission Afghanistan (since 2022)



An aerial photograph of a Middle Eastern landscape. In the foreground, there are brown, hilly terrain with some sparse vegetation and a small town with white buildings. In the middle ground, a valley is filled with numerous greenhouses, creating a grid-like pattern of green and brown. In the background, there are large, hazy mountains under a clear sky.

THE MIDDLE EAST IN A CHANGING WORLD ORDER

In the past as today – the Middle East remains one of the key geopolitical hotspots where global power shifts are intensifying and, unfortunately, have recently erupted into violence.



Geostrategic Change and the Middle East

INTERVIEW Fawwaz Traboulsi

Global powershifts, the rising power of China, the US military disengagement from the Gulf, and the Abraham Accords are closely related topics in their impact on the Middle East. An interview with political scientist and historian, fellow of the AIA **Fawwaz Traboulsi**.

The world is experiencing rapid geostrategic change. What do you think are the biggest changes we are seeing?

The United States' unilateral post-Cold War supremacy in world affairs is being increasingly challenged by two major powers: the Russian Federation – exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine – and China, combining strong economic and technical competition with the rapid development of Beijing's military capabilities. Military tensions between the two countries have increased recently with US military exercises in the Pacific and the tensions between the navies of the two countries in the Taiwan straits.

How do you assess the role of the BRICS countries in this context, especially with a view to the latest summit in South Africa?

An additional challenge to US supremacy is the emergence of the BRICS alliance between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa working toward an alternative world order, which has a special relevance to the countries of the South. In its summit in Johannesburg last August, the alliance was reinforced by six new members, Saudi Arabia (KSA), Egypt, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Ethiopia, Argentina and Iran. BRICS now accounts for 40% of global population, a third of global production, and 40% of its oil production. It is committed to reduce dependence on the US dollar in commercial exchanges, especially in oil, gas and metals – with the ambition of creating a new alternative currency to the American Dollar. Already the US is putting pressure on

Saudi Arabia to receive US dollars for its oils sales to China rather than the yuan. Furthermore, BRICS international presence has lately been forcibly felt when India, Brazil and South Africa took a neutral policy on the war in Ukraine.

In 2020, Israel managed to sign peace agreements with four Arab states: United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan. The Abraham Accords are intended to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between these states and to end existing hostilities. How does this process fit into the broader picture you just outlined?

Much of the developments in the Middle East are related to the US transition from global primacy. The Abraham Accords, initiated under the Trump presidency, should be seen as a joint American-Israeli enterprise with a triple function: (1) to devolve to Israel the security protection of the Gulf states vis-à-vis Iran; (2) to wean away the countries of the region from China, their main oil and gas customer; (3) and to back Benjamin Netanyahu's policy of peace with Arab countries irrespective of any progress along the Palestinian-Israeli peace tract.

How have relations between Israel and the Gulf States developed?

Among the Gulf States, the United Arab Emirates is the one that threw itself without reservation into the normalization process with its economic, social, military and security deals for a total value of \$2 billion. Bahrain, the second country



to normalize, barely reaches a tenth of that volume. Both governments continue to pay lip-service to the two-states solution in Palestine. It is interesting to note that despite its big military and security contracts with Israel, the United Arab Emirates had been negotiating a \$23 billion deal with Washington to purchase fifty F35 jets in addition to nine bomber drones for the defense of its air space! Presently, the deal is on hold, blocked by an Israeli veto and an American investigation into whether the sale 'weakens Israel's military edge'.

What role does Saudi Arabia play in this context?

Saudi Arabia, for its part, set out two conditions for 'normalization': the freezing of settlements (presently, there are 700 thousand settlers in the occupied territories) and the transfer of parts of the occupied West Bank to the Palestinian National Authority (PNA). Yet, it has lately moved one step toward diplomatic representation with Israel by assigning a Saudi non-resident diplomat based in Amman. Qatar is cautiously weighing its ties with both Saudi Arabia and Iran. Its Prime Minister recently declared, "Qatar does not have a war with Israel, the Israelis have an occupation over the Palestinians", and peace should be between them and the Palestinians. Oman has made it clear that it will not be the third Gulf country to normalize with Israel, despite the fact that the late sultan Qaboos had received Prime Minister Netanyahu in October 2018. As for Kuwait, it officially declared that it will be the last Gulf state to

establish 'normal' relations with Israel. In response to all; prime Minister Netanyahu made it clear that he will never stop building settlements but will only temporarily suspend his annexation projects of areas in the West Bank alongside the Jordan River.

China achieved a major breakthrough in Middle Eastern affairs by restoring diplomatic ties between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

It is ironic that China, targeted for isolation by the Abraham Accords, should become the patron of the Iran-Saudi Arabia reconciliation and rapprochement. Saudi Arabia's defection can be explained by a mixture of necessity and ambition. The necessity – to disengage itself from its bloody and destructive war in Yemen which had been going on since 2015. The ambition – to aspire to play the role of regional player.

You just mentioned the war in Yemen. What consequences does this have for the region?

In Yemen, things seem to be progressing slowly since the ceasefire declared by crown prince Muhammad Bin Salman in March 2022, the exchange of prisoners and the lifting of the siege on Hodeida port on the Red Sea. Iran has gained much in keeping Israel away from the Gulf, but has conceded little to Saudi Arabia. While Muhammad Bin Salman aspires to Saudi-Iranian partnership in that region, Iran would rather have security arrangements with the US in the context



The interview with *Fawwaz Traboulsi* was conducted on May 25, 2023, by *Dr. Mayssoun Zein Al Din*.

There is not only the war in Yemen but also conflicts in Syria and in Lebanon. What consequences do these ongoing struggles have for the region?

Syria was welcomed back into Arab League on a Saudi initiative, in line with the Saudi Arabia-Iran entente, in spite of Qatari opposition. Yet this did not interfere with the nearly daily Israeli raids on the military installations of Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah on its territory. The US is also setting up a safety zone of Arab tribes on the borders with Iran, similar to the Kurdish safe zone it set up on the borders with Turkey. And Russian and US forces still clash in the East Euphrates. But the main event in Syria is a new surge of strikes and massive demonstrations in the Soueida governate where the deteriorating economic situation has revived calls for the downfall of Assad.

The Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement is being felt in Lebanon where a joint policy of 'non-intervention' of the two countries in the presidential election was declared during the recent visit of the Iranian Foreign Minister which in Lebanese terms means that Tehran and Riyadh are trying to find a compromise on the choice of the next President. It is not unlikely that Iran-Saudia Arabia condominiums will replace the previous Syria-Saudia Arabia partnership in Lebanon. But while Iran relies on the all-powerful Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia is faced with a leaderless, weak and dispersed Sunni community since the resignation of former Prime Minister Saad Hariri, barely compensated by newly-gained support it enjoys among the opposition Christian parties. In line with the Abraham Accords, a US-brokered agreement was signed in October 2022 to define the maritime borders between Israel and Lebanon that has allowed the latter to begin exploration for oil and gas in its southern blocs. Yet, the by proxy agreement signed by the two governments did not imply any change in the 1949 Armistice Agreement between Lebanon and Israel. A new US initiative is already underway to broker an agreement on the land border where Lebanon is demanding Israeli withdrawal from a number of locations inside its internationally recognized border.

of the nuclear negotiations. We are far from having any clear idea about what a political settlement in Yemen would look like. Negotiations between the Iran-backed Houthi Supreme Political Council and the Saudi government have been halted. Elements of unity will be difficult to maintain in that fractured country which was only united in 1990. A puzzle-like configuration exists in the North between the Houthis, in control of the capital Sanaa and a large part of the Northern governates, and the forces of the Saudi-backed Presidential Leadership Council. In addition to the disputed region of the oil wells, there is an Islamist enclave in Taiz city, under siege by Houthi forces. A climate of coexistence and competition prevails in the South, sometimes culminating in open conflict. A number of actors jostle for position, such as the Presidential Leadership Council temporarily based in Aden, the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC), the United Arab Emirates which controls the port of Aden, and the Saudi Arabia-backed Hadramout National Council which campaigns for the independence of this large and oil-rich governorate. Oman, for its part, is trying to monopolize control over the Mahara governate on its borders.

“It is ironic that China, targeted for isolation by the Abraham Accords, should become the patron of the Iran-KSA reconciliation and rapprochement”

Fawwaz Traboulsi

What effects did the Abraham Accords have on the situation in Palestine?

It is no exaggeration to say that they can be reduced to an unprecedented violence over those past three years. A new war in Gaza, this time against the “metro tunnels” left more than 200 victims; Israeli police attacks on the Al-Aqsa Mosque; the eviction of Palestinians in Sheikh al-Jarrah neighborhood in East Jerusalem; sizeable increase in settlement projects, settlers violence; the highest number of Palestinians killed for years, the majority civilians; the new intifada of 2022 which covered the whole of historical Palestine, with the appearance of independent armed brigades of young people in Nablus and Jenin. Hamas and Islamic Jihad have now become major actors within the National Authority; Hamas and Islamic Jihad have become important players in the territories of the National Authority. There was also the Israeli Defense Forces raid on Jenin last June. As for the role of the Arab regimes, it is business as usual. In Gaza, Egypt mediates with the authority of Hamas, and Qatar is solicited to provide aid for reconstruction after Israeli raids. The United Arab Emirates specializes in relations with the National Authority and is expected to play a major role in the choice of Mahmoud Abbas’s successor. A newcomer with considerable force is Iran, whose military aid explains the increase in size and quality of the military potential of the Islamist movements in Gaza.

How do you assess these developments on the global level with regard to the domestic political disputes in Israel?

All this is going on while Israel suffers from a severe division of Israeli society and political life in reaction to Prime Minister Netanyahu’s attempts to curb the powers of the judiciary and stifle the opposition. Hundreds of thousands of Israelis have been occupying the streets for long months in the name of democracy. ■



FELLOW

FAWWAZ TRABOULSI is a historian, writer and translator. He has taught political science and history at the Lebanese American University and the American University of Beirut. He has been a visiting professor at New York University, the University of Michigan, Columbia University, and the University of Vienna, and a fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford, and the Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin.



EASTERN EUROPE

The Russian war against Ukraine follows an ideological rationale. It has a lasting effect on relations between major powers such as Russia and China, as well as on the relationship between the EU states.



The Russian Ukraine War: Great power ideology and identity politics

The Russian invasion of Ukraine was underpinned by an ideological justification. The Ukrainian national project has gained significant support since 2014, and even more so since 2022.

Prof. Ulrich Schmid,
Keynote, "Ukraine-Russia.
Identity and History in a
Current Conflict"

The Russian aggression against Ukraine began in 2014 and escalated into an open war in 2022. Economic motives can hardly explain the Kremlin's behavior. Instead, Russia's costly and bloody engagement in Ukraine follows an ideological narrative that has been unfolded over time. This narrative comprises two elements which are frequently reiterated in Moscow's war rhetoric. Firstly, it cultivates the conviction that Russia is a "unique civilization" that must not assimilate into a globalized West. Secondly, it calls for a "multipolar world order" to break the hegemony of the United States and the West.

Russian Narratives

The notion of a "unique civilization" originates from Samuel Huntington's concept of the "Clash of Civilizations." However, the Kremlin interprets this concept not as a political science analysis but as a geopolitical directive. The contours of this civilization are rather indistinct and emphasize conservative values such as family and homeland. In 2014, the Ministry of Culture formulated guidelines for state cultural policy, defining culture as a "historically evolved system of values and behavioral norms", oriented towards Russia's





“cultural and historical heritage.” The “unique and authentic Russian civilization” is seen as distinct from “Europe” because it values conservative principles such as traditional family, religious life, and patriotism, which are perceived as eroding in the “decadent West.” These formulations have now found their way into the national security strategy and the revised constitution.

The Primakov Doctrine

The idea of a “multipolar world order” can be traced back to the so-called Primakov Doctrine. Evgenij Primakov (1929–2015) significantly shaped Russian foreign policy as a diplomat, intelligence officer, foreign minister, and prime minister. As early as the 1990s, he worked towards strengthening Russia’s international position, emphasizing resistance to NATO expansion, Eurasian integration, and partnership with China. Putin has endowed all these elements with an aggressive interpretation, shaping his foreign policy accordingly. He sees himself as the executor of a historical mission to correct a perceived deviation—the disintegration of what he calls the Russian lands as they were united in the Tsarist Empire and the Soviet Union.

Ukrainian identity politics

The Russian aggression has significantly boosted support for the Ukrainian national project. Ukraine was one of the Soviet republics that declared its independence after the failed August coup of 1991. Initially, the Ukrainian national project was strongly influenced by Galicia, which had been part of Poland during the interwar period. In the referendum on Ukraine’s independence on 1 December 1991, there was

a nationwide consensus, ranging from 97 percent approval in Galicia to 83 percent in Donbas. Even in Crimea, a majority voted for Ukrainian independence.

However, the Russian propaganda narrative suggesting that Ukraine is not a viable state and that the eastern part of the country wants to become part of Russia was proven absurd by the covert attack on Donbas in 2014 and the overt invasion in 2022. The spread of the Ukrainian national project follows a pattern similar to Italy in the 19th century: Galicia serves as the Ukrainian Piedmont, from which more and more regions join the national unification.

A crucial instrument in this endeavor is Ukrainian identity politics, which strengthens the position of Ukrainian as the sole state language ever further. ■



Ulrich Schmid is Professor of East European Studies at the University of St. Gallen and coordinated the survey-based research project “Ukrainian Regionalism”.

Relationship Status: Perfect imbalance?



INTERVIEW with **Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova**



of private property, Russia was not perceived by China as a developed country. On the other hand, China had an edge in this relationship even before 24 February 2022 and the sanctions. This is due to its sheer population size, economic output, innovation, and, of course, the centralization that Xi Jinping has undertaken. After the sanctions kicked in, that was a finger-pointing to make China's place even stronger, to make it more visible that Russia tends to be the easier partner because it simply doesn't have many countries to turn to. It doesn't have a lot of options. It was also very revealing that at the meeting with Xi Jinping in Moscow a few months ago, no agreement on the Power of Siberia 2 was signed. The Chinese are haggling. They're trying to get the best deal

You are doing research on China and Russia. How has the relationship between the two states changed since the Russian attack on Ukraine?

After Russia's attack on Ukraine, we've become more aware of the role that China can play in this constellation. I think China is also using this kind of leverage, either whether this is real or imaginary. It's hard to say because we don't have enough data to attest with certainty that Xi Jinping has Putin's ear. But certainly, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has made this relationship and its implications for global security even more real.

Do you share the impression that the balance of power between the two states has shifted?

Personally, I've used the term 'the perfect imbalance' to describe this relationship. Russia's economy was not diversified even before the full-scale invasion. When it comes to innovation, diversification, accountability, and the sanctity

from the Russians, and they understand the situation the Russians are in. The war has tipped the scales even more.

Putin and Xi agreed on stronger military cooperation at that meeting. What does that actually entail?

Military cooperation is one of the great unknowns, because of all the secretive industries, this is the most secretive. But just looking at the people who are represented in the bilateral talks, you can assume that there are definitely some technological transfers. China is exploiting this situation in a very opportunistic way. Some of the military technologies of the 20th century that China just never got around to developing are now available to the Chinese because the Russians are short of cash. So, maybe some areas of military technology that were once off limits are not anymore because the Russians are concerned. Another level that we can definitely observe is the symbolic alignment of the military – the joint overflights over the Americans,

the visit of the Americans to Japan, the joint exercises, Vostok 2022, where the Chinese were also represented. On a symbolic level, Russia is trying to make its military cooperation with the Chinese known and visible.

So, who benefits from whom? Russia more than China?

I think for any relationship to work, each side has to have some interest in it. Russia has the old, China some of the newer technology. And then there are some technologies that can only be developed if you have the old technology as a stepping stone. So, on the one hand, Russia benefits because it needs partners, and it needs to demonstrate that it has partners. On the other hand, this is also a good opportunity for China to perhaps rewrite some rules of cooperation.

Do you see a common strategy against the West?

That is definitely one of the major strategic goals underlying this relationship. Both countries want a world in which the United States is no longer the dominant security actor. They want a world where Western powers and like-minded powers in the Indo-Pacific region – Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand – no longer have the upper hand in the global security architecture. So, this is definitely a shared feeling, and it shows in the rhetoric. That is why I'm skeptical about China's role as a mediator or as a neutral power when it comes to Russia's war on Ukraine, because in the strategic and geopolitical outlook, China's long term goal is closer to Russia's than to Ukraine's.

Are Russia and China also strategic rivals, for example, for influence in Africa and South America?

I would say that Russia's ambitions are not the same as Chinese ambitions in third regions. China's ambitions are, of course, to develop these relationships, to find a shortcut to resources, to have export markets for its infrastructure and to build capacities to also have export markets for its capital as well in terms of loans. For Russians, it's more about meddling and keeping things complicated. What we saw in Mali is not exactly a state building effort on the part of Russia. If anything, it's a very destabilizing endeavor. However, we should not overstate the strategic competition between these two actors in third regions. For instance, they seem comfortable with each other in Central Asia, where one would actually expect some kind of strategic competition.



FELLOW

UNA ALEKSANDRA BĒRZIŅA-ČERENKOVA

is a political scientist, China scholar, Head of the PhD programme in Political Science and the Centre for China Studies at Riga Stradins University, Head of the Asia programme at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs, member of the China in Europe Research Network (CHERN) and the European Think Tank Network on China (ETNC). She is an affiliate of the Lau Institute at King's College, London.

What does Russia generally have to offer as a partner in Africa or South America apart from weapons?

Russia doesn't have as much to offer as China. Through all sorts of initiatives, especially the Belt and Road Initiative, China openly states that there are other paths towards modernity. From China's perspective, you don't have to follow the Western liberal and democratic example to achieve prosperity. In contrast, Russia does not offer an alternative path. It does not try to convince other countries of the Russian perspective. Russia merely acts as a spoiler; pushing against the West, but doesn't really try to offer anything. So, I think that's the big difference.

What comes after Putin and what after Xi? Do their autocratic systems have a future or are they tied to their respective ruler?

I would say that, in the case of Russia, the perishing of Vladimir Putin alone would not mean a change in the system for the better. Russia has a depleted civil society. Many people are simply not interested in politics, full of apathy and distrust of the West. In my view, it

will take more than just Putin's head on a pike to change the system, in the case of China even more. Xi Jinping has used his over a decade-long tenure to create a vertical system that is institutionally disempowering. Xi Jinping has been in power longer than he was supposed to, breaking the tradition of two terms. But even if Xi Jinping departs in some form, the system will endure, and someone else will come in. The current trends will continue because they are also shaped by the international environment and the widely shared perception within China's population that they are under pressure from the United States and not allowed to develop. ■

“Both countries want a world in which the United States is no longer the dominant security actor.”

Una Aleksandra Bērziņa-Čerenkova

EU-NATO Relations after Russia's War against Ukraine

Russia's renewed aggression against Ukraine since 24 February 2022 has highlighted the return of large-scale military violence to Europe.

The peace dividend that the continent had reaped since the end of the Cold War has been upended. Scholars and observers have been quick to point out that the war has become 'a turning point' for Euro-Atlantic and global security. The existential military threat coming from the Kremlin prompted many European countries to reconsider their long-standing defence policy decisions. But the war also brought the EU and NATO closer together – the two main institutional pillars of the European security order.

Security threats have changed

Relations between the EU and NATO have always been uneasy. That these two organizations existed in isolation from each other made perfect sense during the Cold War: one provided internal prosperity and the other external security. However, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the landscape of security threats has changed, and the two organizations' tasks have increasingly overlapped. This led to concerns about an optimal way for the two institutions to coexist. Since the early 2000s, the leadership of the two organizations has defined their relationship as a

strategic partnership. At the same time, officials and diplomats regularly stressed the unrealized potential of the partnership and the mutual distrust between the two institutions. This often resulted in competition and duplication of efforts, such as in the field of crisis management.

In the Ukraine war, the roles and tasks of the EU and NATO have become clearer. Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine has added more clarity to the distribution of roles and responsibilities between the two organizations. Firstly, NATO is returning to its original mission of ensuring the collective security of its members against Russia. As outlined in NATO's 2022 Strategic Concept, defence and deterrence are clearly taking a priority over the Alliance's other post-Cold War tasks, such as crisis prevention and cooperative security. This is important, since the Trump administration has previously damaged Europe's confidence in the Western Alliance, with French President Macron dubbing it 'brain dead' and questioning Europe's dependence on the United States. Russia's brutal invasion and the scale of its conventional warfare leave no one in

any doubt that NATO, not the EU, must organize the continent's collective defence.

Secondly, the Western response to the Russian aggression has highlighted complementarity between the two organizations. NATO has provided what the EU cannot: reassuring its allies on the Eastern flank by bolstering its military presence in the air, on land, and at sea. The EU offered what NATO cannot: financing military assistance to Ukraine, humanitarian aid, massive economic sanctions against Russia, and the prospect of membership. In addition, the EU set up a military assistance mission to train 30,000 Ukrainian soldiers and decided to jointly procure ammunition for Kyiv. If anything, the war has galvanized the EU's leadership role in non-military instruments of power. This complementarity and coherence between the EU and NATO are crucial for achieving multiplier effects in maximizing costs of aggression to Putin's regime.

New areas of cooperation

In January 2023, the EU and NATO released a joint declaration that reiterated 'unwavering and continued





support' for Ukraine. It condemned 'in the strongest possible terms' Russia's aggression referring to it as 'the gravest threat to Euro-Atlantic security in decades'. The shock of war in Europe apparently turned out not to be grave enough to unblock high-level political cooperation between the EU and NATO. It continues to be complicated by Turkey's non-recognition of Cyprus, and Ankara's zero-sum view on the relations between the two organizations. However, the joint declaration reinforced the practical cooperation between the two institutions by expanding it to new areas such as critical infrastructure protection. This step

adds to existing areas of cooperative engagement between the two institutions, which include hybrid threats, cyber security, defence industries, capacity building, defence capabilities, operations and exercises. Even though one of Russia's consistent goals in its relations with the West has always been to divide the transatlantic community, by launching the biggest war in Europe since the World War Two, it clearly has achieved the exact opposite. A reinforced and strengthened EU-NATO partnership is a manifestation of Moscow's failure. ■

“A reinforced and strengthened EU-NATO partnership is a manifestation of Moscow's failure.”

Iulian Romanyshyn



FELLOW

IULIAN ROMANYSHYN holds a PhD in Political Science from the IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, Master and Bachelor degrees from the Universities of Maastricht, Bruges and Kyiv. His research includes EU transatlantic and European security and defence policy. His work has been acknowledged with the 2018 Global Strategy PhD Prize by the Egmont Institute for International Relations and the European Security and Defence College.



THE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

The Academy of International Affairs NRW in the Federal City of Bonn is dedicated to the global challenges and structural changes in international politics in the 21st century. As the Academy's central focus, its Fellowship programme promotes scientific and scholarly excellence and builds international and interdisciplinary connections.





INSIGHT AIA

Committed to Science and Research

The Academy of International Affairs NRW was established with the intention of embracing a truly interdisciplinary approach. The focus is on promoting scientific research on a wide range of topics and establishing an exchange platform between science and representatives from politics, business, the media, and the public.



The Academy is an independent scientific institution with the legal form of a non-profit limited liability company, which is fully funded by the State of North Rhine-Westphalia.

Located in the former diplomatic quarter of Bonn-Bad Godesberg, the Academy benefits from excellent starting conditions. In addition to its university of excellence, the federal city is home to numerous international and national research institutions; political institutions, the UN campus, and various federal ministries. International affairs today extend far beyond the confines of any single academic discipline, delving into areas such as international law, climate issues, economics, and philosophical perspectives. The Academy seeks to unite theory and practice, recognizing that complex and challenging questions can only be adequately addressed through a multiperspectival lens.

RETHINK POLITICS

A core element of this multiperspectival approach is the fellowship program, which promotes research in the field of international politics at the highest level. Scientists as well as practitioners from a wide range of disciplines are given the opportunity to conduct research on the most pressing topics in international politics.

The Fellowship Program of the Academy is aimed at outstanding and highly qualified scholars and scientists of all nationalities. Applicants from all disciplines who are researching in the Academy's thematic area are welcome. Apart from political science, legal studies, economics, history, sociology and philosophy applications from science and technology studies are welcome as well once they address relevant issues of social dynamics. Experts with professional experience in the fields of politics, diplomacy, business, NGOs and the media are eligible for short-term fellowships. The focus is thereby on the exchange between research and practice and the practical application of scientific findings. The selection of research projects follows a cross-sectoral and interdisciplinary approach which forms the cornerstone of the Academy's goal to foster new ideas and devise new solutions for future-focused politics.

PLATFORM FOR INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE

Since its foundation, the Academy has pursued the goal of hosting events at its own premises to encourage lively debate on important topics in international politics.

The Academy therefore hosts a variety of public events, symposia, conferences, fireside talks and workshops in order to promote academic excellence and further strengthen Bonn as a research hub for international politics. The various event formats allow the Academy to encourage public discourse on current developments in international politics and bring political actors and scholars together to exchange ideas and engage in thought-provoking discussions.

In summary, the Academy represents a great addition to the science landscape in Bonn and North Rhine-Westphalia and provides invaluable insights by promoting a strong network of global minds with local excellency.

AIA Team



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ZEIN AL DIN**

Executive Director



STEPHAN MASSELING

Head of Administration



**PRIV.-DOZ. DR.
MANUEL BECKER**

Head of Scientific
Programme



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Academic Coordinator Fellowship
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Personal Assistant
to the Executive Director



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Events and Public Relations
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MARTIN HILDEBRANDT

Fellow Services



RAED MOKDAD

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PASCALE SCHRÖDER

Student Assistant



The **Academy of International Affairs** in Bonn:
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RETHINK
POLITICS

Reservoirs of Knowledge: The Academic Advisory Board of AIA



From front left: *Akosua Adomako Ampofo, Jaclyn Neo, Angelika Nußberger, Maysoun Zein Al Din, Ulrich Schlie*
From back left: *Mark Speich, Róbert Spanó, Mikko Huotari*

“The Board derives substantial benefit from the diverse experiences and expertise of its members, hailing from a variety of global regions and actively engaged across various domains of academia and practice.”

Angelika Nußberger



The Academic Advisory Board of the Academy for International Affairs commenced its work during the pandemic, a period marked by challenges to international collaboration. However, at present, annual meetings for the selection of new fellows and the provision of scholarly counsel to the Academy have been reinstated. The Board derives substantial benefit from the diverse experiences and expertise of its members, hailing from a variety of global regions and actively engaged across various domains of academia and practice. Professor Adomako Ampofo is from Ghana where she works at the Institute for African Studies, her focal points spanning Gender Studies and analyses of social inequalities. Professor Neo from the National University of Singapore complements the Advisory Board team. She is attached to the National University of Singapore’s Centre for Asian Legal Studies and deals with issues concerning religious jurisprudence and comparative constitutional law. Three scholars from the United States of America enrich the Board’s composition: Professor Robert Litwak, based at the Wilson Center specializing in International Security Studies; Professor Branko Milanovic, affiliated with the Stone Center on Socio-Economic Inequality at the City University of New York; and Professor Monica Baumgarten de Bolle, representing the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington D.C.. The Academy maintains a connection to Cambridge through Professor Christopher Hill, an Emeritus of the Department for Politics and International Studies. Dr. Robin Niblett contributes a distinct wealth of expertise, having directed the renowned Chatham House – The Royal Institute of

International Affairs in London for several years. Thierry de Montbrial is the Founder and President of the French Institute of International Relations. Contributions from the German contingent include Professor Ulrich Schlie, longstanding foreign policy advisor to the Federal Government and current professor at the Center for Advanced Security, Strategic, and Integration Studies at the University of Bonn. Dr. Mark Speich, State Secretary for Federal and European Affairs, International Relations, and Media in North Rhine-Westphalia, is one of the initiators of the Academy’s establishment project, and represents the regional government within the Advisory Board.

In my capacity as Chairperson, it is a profound delight to collaborate with colleagues from both domestic and international spheres, leveraging their extensive reservoirs of knowledge and thereby contributing to the realization of the Academy for International Affairs’ mission. ■

Professor Dr. Dr. h.c. Dr. h.c. Angelika Nußberger is a legal scholar. She heads the Institute for Eastern European Law and Comparative Law at the University of Cologne, where she is also Director of the Academy for European Human Rights Protection.

Members of the Academic Advisory Board

The interdisciplinary **Academic Advisory Board** decides on the awarding of fellowships and advises the Academy on scientific issues. It thus makes an important contribution to the Academy's profile and its central tasks.



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
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Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, London



**DR.
MAHA YAHYA**

Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center, Lebanon



CELEBRATORY EVENT

Opening Ceremony of the Academy of International Affairs NRW

On 25 August 2021, the formal inauguration of the Academy of International Affairs NRW (AIA NRW) was held at the invitation of **Armin Laschet**, former Minister President of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia.



Located at the Academy's headquarters in Bonn-Bad Godesberg, Maysoun Zein Al Din, extended a warm welcome to the many distinguished guests from the realms of politics and academia. Among the esteemed guests were Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo; president of the Republic of Ghana, Jean Asselborn, Luxembourg's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, former Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, and Nathanael Liminski, Minister for Federal and European Affairs, International Affairs and Media of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia and Head of the State Chancellery. The opening ceremony marked a significant milestone in the pursuit of strengthening the position of the federal city of Bonn and the State of North Rhine-Westphalia as a hub for international politics. By bringing together individuals who might not otherwise cross paths, and fostering a diverse and inclusive environment where a multitude of perspectives can coexist harmoniously, the Academy can contribute to developing futureproof solutions.



RETHINK
POLITICS

Impressions from the Academy Opening Ceremony

25.08.2021





Guests from the worlds of politics and research:

Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, President of the Republic of Ghana, *Jean Asselborn*, Foreign Minister of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the former Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, *Rangin Dadfar Spanta*, *Jakub Wawrzyniak*, Consul General of the Republic of Poland and Doyen of the Consular Corps of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia.



ACADEMY EVENTS

08/21–03/24

2021

SUMMER ACADEMY
**“Artificial Intelligence and
 International Politics”**
23.08. – 26.08.

Keynotes by Prof. Dr. Christopher Coker, LSE; Prof. Rogier Creemers, Leiden University, Dr. Ulrike Franke, ECFR; Prof. Kristian Kersting, TU Darmstadt; Prof. Maximilian Mayer, University of Bonn, Dr. Petra Molnar, York University, and Prof. Aimee van Wynsberghe, University of Bonn

OPENING
Opening Ceremony of the Academy
25.08.

Opening remarks by Armin Laschet, former Minister President of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia, Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo; President of the Republic of Ghana, Jean Asselborn, Foreign Minister of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, and the former Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, Rangin Dadfar Spanta

2022

RECEPTION
**Reception of the Consular
 Corps of the State of North Rhine-
 Westphalia**
15.02.



With a keynote about Cyber Diplomacy by Regine Grienberger, Cyber Ambassador, German Foreign Office

KEYNOTE & DISCUSSION
**“Ukraine-Russia. Identity and
 History in a Current Conflict”**
01.03.

Keynote and discussion with Prof. Ulrich Schmid, University of St. Gallen

SELECTION MEETING
**“Meeting of the selection commit-
 tee for the first fellow cohort”**
25.03.

CONFERENCE
**“Social Media Impact on
 International Affairs”**
23.05.–25.05.

Convened by Prof. Reinhold Kliegl, University of Potsdam, Dr. Olessia Koltsova, National Research University Higher School of Economics, St. Petersburg, and Prof. Stephan Lewandowsky, University of Bristol

DISCUSSION
**“Friendship without Boundaries?
 The Russian-Chinese relationship
 during the war in Ukraine and its
 implications for Europe’s future”**
14.06.

With Dr. Una Bērziņa-Čerenkova, Riga Stradins University, Dr. Sarah Kirchberger, Kiel University, and Prof. Maximilian Mayer, University of Bonn

WORKSHOP**“The Global Politics of Artificial Intelligence”****23.06.–24.06.**

Convened by Dr. Appoline Taillandier, University of Bonn

CONSTITUENT MEETING**Constituent meeting of the Academic Advisory Board (online)****27.06.****SUMMER ACADEMY****“The Geopolitics of Disinformation – social media and international relations”****29.08.–01.09.**

Keynotes by Alexandra Geese, EU Parliament; Prof. Anita Gohdes, Hertie School of Governance, Prof. Sergei Guriev, Sciences Po, Dr. Aliaksandr Herasimenka, University of Oxford, Ayushman Kaul, Logically AI; Prof. Sarah Kreps, Cornell University, Hao Li; pinscreen & Herbert Reul, Minister of the Interior of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia

RECEPTION

Reception with the Minister for Federal and European Affairs, International Affairs and Media of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia and Head of the State Chancellery Nathanael Liminski

30.08.**CONFERENCE****“Digitalization of Memory in China”****21.09.–22.09.**

Convened by Prof. Maximilian Mayer, University of Bonn

SELECTION MEETING**Selection meeting of the Academic Advisory Boards****24.09.****FIRESIDE TALK**

Exchange on Cyber Security with Acting National Cyber Director in the Office of the National Cyber Director in the White House, Ms. Kemba Walden with experts from the State of North Rhine-Westphalia

28.09.**PANEL DISCUSSION**

“Assessing Climate and Security Research in North Rhine-Westphalia”

30.09.

Panel discussion with Dr. Ines Dombrowsky IDOS, Bonn; Prof. Dr. Jakob Rhyner, Bonn Alliance, Dr. Lukas Hermwille, Wuppertal Institut; Prof. Dr. Shen Xiaomeng, United Nations University, Bonn, moderated by Dr. Mayssoun Zein Al Din, AIA NRW, in cooperation with the Center for Advanced Security, Strategic and Integration Studies (CASSIS) under the umbrella of the ISFB 2022

WORKSHOP

“Emerging Market Democracies as Pivotal States. Regional Powers in an Eroded Liberal International Order”

13.10.–15.10.

Convened by Prof. Laurence Whitehead, University of Oxford & Dr. Vinícius G. Rodrigues Vieira, Armando Alvarez Penteadó Foundation (FAAP)

EXPERT DISCUSSION

“Artificial Intelligence: A new Arms Race?”

09.11.

Expert discussion hosted by State Secretary Dr. Mark Speich with Prof. Maximilian Mayer, University of Bonn, Dr. Melanie Sisson, The Brookings

Institute, Andrea Gilli, NATO Defense College, and members of the German Parliament, scholars as well as representatives of the Federal Foreign Office; private companies and the media

KEYNOTE & DISCUSSION

“Freedom of Expression in the 21st Century. Between democratic backsliding, disinformation, and the limits of tolerance”

18.11.

Keynotes and discussion with Dr. h. c. Elena Zhemkova, Memorial International; Prof. Róbert Spanó & Natahnael Liminski, Minister for Federal and European Affairs, International Affairs and Media and Head of the State Chancellery of North Rhine-Westphalia

CONFERENCE

“Bordering on Disorder. Fragile borders in a global world”

05.12.

Convened by Prof. Todd Hatalay, Fleming College, Canada & Prof. Christian Leuprecht, Royal Military College, Canada

2023**DISCUSSION**

Discussion with a Delegation of the German-Hungarian Institute on the German Federal System and International Relations

24.01.

WORKSHOP**“The EU-AI Act and Voices From the Global South”****02.03.**

Convened by Gaurav Sharma, GIZ, Fellow AIA NRW

KEYNOTE & DISCUSSION**“Ethics, Law and Artificial Intelligence – A Tense Relationship”****08.03.**

Keynote and discussion with Prof. John-Stewart Gordon, LSMU, Lithuania, in cooperation with the German Museum Bonn

PARLIAMENTARY MEETING**“The Evacuation of the Local Forces in Afghanistan – Lessons Learnt”****15.03.**

Parliamentary meeting in the German Bundestag with keynotes by AIA NRW fellows Prof. Cristian Leuprecht, Royal Military College, Canada, Dr. Jamie Ferrill, Charles Sturt University Australia, Tim Lannan, NATO, Brussels, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, former Minister of Defense, Michael Müller, MdB, Dr. Ralf Stegner, MdB

PANEL DISCUSSION**“Beloved, reviled, forgotten? On the future of the European Union”****16.03.**

Panel discussion with Jean Asselborn, Foreign Minister of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Stefan Engstfeld, MdL, Michaela Wiegel, FAZ, Dr. Maysoun Zein Al Din, AIA NRW in cooperation with the

Bonner Academy for Research and Education of Practical Politics (BAPP)

WORKSHOP**“Rehabilitating Civil Military Relations Post Afghanistan”****29.03.**

Convened by Fellow Tim Lannan, NATO with keynotes by Amb. Stefano Pontecorvo, Former NATO Ambassador and Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta, former Foreign Minister of Afghanistan

PARLIAMENTARY MEETING**“The Evacuation of the Local Forces in Afghanistan – Lessons Learnt”****31.03.**

Parliamentary breakfast session in the North Rhine-Westphalian State Parliament with keynotes by Prof. Cristian Leuprecht, Royal Military College, Canada, Dr. Jamie Ferrill, Charles Sturt University Australia, Tim Lannan, NATO, Brussels

EXPERT PANEL AND DISCUSSION**“The Situation in Moldova and the Role of the European Union in Southeastern Europe”****04.05.**

Expert panel and discussion with Inna Şupac, Fellow AIA NRW & Ambassador (ret.) Dr. Thomas Mayr-Harting, Special Representative of the OSCE

WORKSHOP**“European Security and Defence after Russia’s Attack on Ukraine”****15.-16.05.**

Convened by Dr. Iulian Romanyshyn, Fellow AIA NRW, opening remarks by Prof. James Bindenagel, ret. US-Ambassador to Germany,

CONFERENCE**“10 years BRI-Learning processes; policy adaptations and managing complexity”****06.-07.07.**

Convened by Prof. Maximilian Mayer, Center for Advanced Security, Strategic and Integration Studies (CAS-SIS) in cooperation with AIA NRW and keynote by Chang Ching (Society for Strategic Studies, R.O.C.)

SUMMER ACADEMY**“Outer Space Affairs – a critical key domain of international politics”****03.-07.09.**

Keynotes by Prof. Mai ´a Davis Cross, Northeastern University; Prof. Simonetta Di Pippo, SDA Bocconi; Prof. Alexander Geppert, New York University, Dr. Martin Schwarmborn, University of Cologne, Dr. Sarah Lieberman, Canterbury Christ Church University, Dr. Gilles Rabin, French Embassy, Berlin, Dr. Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan, Observer

Research Foundation New Delhi, and Dr. Johann-Dietrich Wörner, National Academy of Science and Engineering (acatech)

WORKSHOP
“Deconstructing Masculinities as the Local Meets the Global”
13.-15.09.

Convened by Prof. Akosua Adomako Ampofo, University of Ghana, Member of the Academic Board, AIA NRW

WORKSHOP
“Challenges of the Neutrality Status of Moldova in New Realities”
25.-26.09.



Convened by Inna Supac, Fellow AIA NRW, opening remarks by H.E. Aureliu Ciocoi, Moldovan Ambassador to Germany

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY FORUM BONN (ISFB)
“Religious Extremism in World out of Joint”
19.-22.10.



Under the patronage of the Minister President of the State of North Rhine-Westphalia with opening remarks by Prof. Andreas Zimmer, Vice Rector for Research and Early-Career Researchers, University of Bonn; Prof. Ulrich

Schlie, Henry Kissinger Professor for Security and Strategic Studies, Director of CASSIS, University of Bonn and Nicole Unterseh, First Deputy Mayor, City of Bonn, keynote by Pauline Kao, Consul General for the United States in North Rhine-Westphalia

BOOK LAUNCH
“Handbook of Political Islam in Europe – Activities, Means and Strategies from Salafists to Muslim Brotherhood and Beyond”
20.10.

Book launch by Prof. Dr. Thomas Jäger & Ralph Thiele

CONFERENCE
“Global Power Shifts and the World After the Wars”
15.11.

Conference in cooperation with Villa Vigoni, the Center for Advanced Security, Strategic and Integration Studies (CASSIS) & supported by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research

WORKSHOP
“Europe’s Future Orders – Europe in Future International Orders”
16.11.

Convened by Prof. Wolfram Hilz, University of Bonn in cooperation with University of Warsaw, AIA NRW & KAS

WORKSHOP
“Diplomatic Communication, Disinformation & Conflict”
04.-05.12.

Convened by Dr. Juris Pupcenoks, Fellow AIA NRW and Dr. Katharina MacLarren, Fellow AIA NRW

2024

WORKSHOP
“Advancing Economic Paradiplomacy: Unveiling Opportunities and Best Practices”
18.-19.01.

Convened by Vivek Anand, Fellow AIA NRW

PANEL DISCUSSION
“The Middle East in a changing World Order”
26.01.

Panel discussion with Navid Kermani and Dr. Maysoun Zein Al Din, AIA NRW, in cooperation with the University of Cologne

WORKSHOP
“When Different Conceptions of Truth and Honesty Clash: Authenticity vs. Factuality in the Context of Northern Ireland”
25.-26.03.

Convened by Prof. Stephan Lewandowsky, University of Bristol, Fellow AIA NRW

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